

African Conflict Resolution Act Interagency Progress Report for Fiscal Years 1999/2000

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Table of Contents

ACRONYMS	iv
Introduction	1
PART I - CONTINENT-WIDE INITIATIVES	4
African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS).....	4
Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)	5
<i>Africa Journal</i>	9
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.....	9
The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).....	6
Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities Initiative (EIPC)	7
International Military and Education Training (IMET).....	7
Inter-Africa Group (IAG).....	7
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)	8
Organization of African Unity (OAU)	8
State Department Political Military Bureau (PM)	8
US-Africa Ministerial: Partnership for the Twenty First Century	9
Voice of America (VOA).....	9
PART II - CENTRAL AFRICA	12
Burundi.....	12
Chad.....	12
Congo, Republic of (Congo-Brazzaville).....	13
Rwanda	14
PART III - EASTERN AFRICA	16
Comoros	16
Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Dispute	16
Ethiopia	17
Kenya.....	18
Sudan	18
Uganda	19
PART IV - SOUTHERN AFRICA	20
African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)	20
Southern African Development Community (SADC).....	20
University of Capetown.....	20
Angola	21
Malawi	22
Mozambique	22
Namibia	23
South Africa.....	23
Swaziland	24
Zambia	24
Zimbabwe.....	24

PART V - WESTERN AFRICA.....	26
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).....	26
ECOWAS Military Observation Group (ECOMOG).....	26
Exercise Flintlock.....	26
Trips by the Presidential Envoy for Democracy and Human Rights in Africa	26
Ghana	26
Guinea-Bissau.....	28
Liberia	28
Mali.....	29
Mauritania	30
Niger	30
Nigeria.....	30
Senegal.....	31
Sierra Leone	31
Togo.....	32
Appendix A	33
Remarks by President William J. Clinton at the Conference on U.S.-Africa Partnership for the 21st Century - Washington, DC, March 1999	
Appendix B	38
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright's Speech before the Economic Community of West African States and the Nigerian Community - Abuja, Nigeria, October 1999	
Appendix C	44
"United States Interests in Africa: Post-Cold War, Post-Apartheid," Speech delivered by Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Susan E. Rice before the Rhodes Scholars Southern Africa Forum - Oxford, England, May 1999	
Appendix D	50
"Prospects for Peace in Sierra Leone," Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Susan E. Rice Testimony before the House International Relations Subcommittee on Africa - Washington, DC, March 1999	
Appendix E	58
"The Ethiopian-Eritrean War: U.S. Policy Options," Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Susan E. Rice, Testimony before the House International Relations Subcommittee on Africa - Washington, DC, May 1999	
Appendix F.....	62
"Central African Conflict and its Implications for Africa and for the Future of U.S. Policy Goals and Strategies," Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Susan E. Rice, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs - Washington, DC, June 1999	
Appendix G.....	67
"Nigeria: On the Democracy Path?" - Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Ambassador Howard Jeter, Testimony before the House International Relations Subcommittee on Africa - Washington, DC, August 1999	



ACRONYMS

ACCORD	African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACRI	Africa Crisis Response Initiative
ACRA	African Conflict Resolution Act
ACSS	African Center for Strategic Studies
ADC	African Dialogue Center for Conflict Management and Development Issues
ADR	Alternate Dispute Resolution
APC	All People's Congress
CSBM	Confidence and Security Building Measure
COMESA	The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CND	National Demining Commission (Mozambique)
CPAF	Conflict Pilot Activity Fund
CPLP	Community of Portuguese-Speaking States
CQUICK	Conflict Quick Response Fund
CRN	Council of National Reconciliation (Niger)
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DHRF	Democracy and Human Rights Fund
DOD	Department of Defense
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Military Observation Group

ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDA	Emergency Drawdown Authorities
EIPC	Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities Initiative
E-IMET	Expanded International Military Education and Training
EUCOM	US European Command
FAR	Armed Forces of the Former Regime and Interhamwe of Rwanda
FONGA	Forum of Angolan NGOs
FRODEBU	Burundi Democratic Front
HIV/AIDS	Human Immune Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
HDP	Humanitarian Demining Program
IAG	Inter-Africa Group
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IMSSA	Independent Mediation Service for South Africa
JCET	Joint Combined Exercise Training
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
LWV	League of Women Voters
MAC	Mine Action Center
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MFDC	Democratic Forces of Casamance Movement
MINURCA	Mission des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine
MISAB	Mission Interafricaine de Surveillance des Accords de Bangui
MLC	Movement for the Liberation of the Congo

MP	Member of Parliament
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NADR	Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs
NDO	National Demining Office
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NPFL	National Patriotic Front for Liberia
NPRC	National Provisional Ruling Council
NRM	Natural Resource Management
NSC	National Security Council
NSCC	New Sudan Council of Churches
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
PM	Political Military Affairs Bureau
PRM	Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration
RDC	Congolese Rally for Democracy
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SA/LW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SMP	Staff Monitoring Program
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
STAR	Sudan Transitional Assistance for Rehabilitation
UNAFRI	United Nations African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders

UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNITA	Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNOPS	United Nations Office of Project Support
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UN SYG	United Nations Secretary General
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USIS	US Information Service
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
WA	Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies
WFP	World Food Program
WVF	Senator Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund
VOA	Voice of America
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front



Introduction

Africa ended the twentieth century as a paradox of failure and progress. During the 1990s, the number of democratically elected governments in Sub-Saharan Africa more than quadrupled. Apartheid was relegated to the dustbin of history, and South Africa went on to see the successful transfer of power from one democratically elected government to another in the space of eight years. Nigeria, the most populous country and a linchpin in the continent, also saw the end of a military regime and the return of civilian rule legitimized by ballots. In the context of renewed democratic aspirations, at least two-thirds of the 48 nations in the region have embarked on economic reforms leading to a resumption of growth after a decade of economic stagnation. Among several remarkable successes, once war-torn Mozambique recorded double-digit economic growth rates in 1998, giving concrete evidence of the high returns of peace.

Still, too many Africans suffer under the threat of poverty, disease - especially HIV/AIDS - and conflicts. The African Conflict Resolution Act (ACRA) of October 14, 1994 declared that a key goal for United States (US) foreign policy should be to help institutionalize conflict resolution capability in Africa, and authorized, for FY 1995-1998, several specific types of assistance to this end. These provisions encompassed:

- Strengthening the conflict resolution capability of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
- Strengthening the conflict resolution capability of subregional organizations in sub-saharan Africa;
- Assisting non-governmental organizations (NGOs) engaged in mediation and conciliation efforts in sub-Saharan Africa;
- Demobilization and retraining into civilian society of African armed forces
- Education and training in conflict resolution and peacekeeping for sub-Saharan African civilian and military personnel under IMET

ACRA also provided for annual reporting to Congress on implementation of those activities. This report describes the activities under the Act, as well as broader activities in support of peaceful resolution of conflicts in Africa, carried out in FY 99 by the agencies that comprise the US foreign affairs community, including the Department of State, United States Agency for International Development, United States Information Agency, Department of Justice, Department of Defense, and other bodies. This is the final report under ACRA.

The imperative for US action persisted as Africa remained the most violence-prone region in the world. According to the Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict Research, in 1999 a total of 34 violent conflicts were registered around the world, 12 (or 35%) of which played out on African soil. The global trend has been for a decline of conflicts involving force. But on the African continent, while the number of conflicts fell slightly, there was a shift to greater intensity. In nearly two-thirds of African conflicts occasional, more frequent, or even regular use of violence was to be found – including Ethiopia/Eritrea and Angola, for example. In the heart of Africa alone, at least eight countries have been embroiled in an immensely dangerous war over the resource-rich Congo.

The US has a significant humanitarian stake in Africa because many Americans, both among the 33 million US citizens who can trace their roots to that continent and those from other groups, feel a strong obligation to better the lives of people throughout Africa. In 1998, the American people provided over \$700 million in development and humanitarian assistance through private organizations to the victims of war, famine and disease in Africa; *total* US assistance in FY1999, provided bilaterally and through UN organizations, was an estimated \$1848.8 million.

Every violent conflict in Africa poses the threat of yet another humanitarian disaster and another occasion to divert scarce resources from the productive investments that are the indispensable means for truly bettering the lives of ordinary Africans. But beyond the humanitarian concern, conflict in Africa may threaten US security and economic interests. Terrorism and extremism, arms and drug trafficking, white-collar crime syndicates, environmental degradation, and communicable diseases are examples of transnational threats that are most difficult to prevent, contain or control where conflicts are most enduring.

In addition, the US is deepening its commercial interests in Africa. The US relies on Africa as a source of strategic minerals, including platinum, cobalt, bauxite and manganese, and within the next decade, oil imports from Africa are projected to surpass those from the Persian Gulf region. Today, 100,000 US jobs are tied to its exports to Africa and there is room to grow. With 700 million potential consumers, and at the same time fewer telephones in the entire continent than in the borough of Manhattan, Africa is truly the last frontier for US exporters and investors.

The potential for a strong US-Africa partnership, however, cannot be realized without strong, democratic and economically viable partners. Therefore, the US remains committed to boosting democracy, supporting market and political reforms, and promoting respect for human rights in Africa. These long-term endeavors will contribute to minimize the risk of conflicts fueled by factors such as poverty; poor access to food, health care and education; inefficient infrastructure; rising ethnic tensions; and the proliferation of weapons.

The United States also continues to play an active role in helping African countries to prevent, mitigate, resolve and recover from conflicts. As the nature of these conflicts has evolved, the US is guided by the understanding that it must work in concert with the peace-inclined people and leaders in Africa and with the international community and the United Nations to achieve these aims. Thus, US assistance is extended bilaterally and through multilateral organizations in many forms. High-level preventive diplomacy and direct conflict mediation is complemented by financial and technical support to strengthen the capacity of governmental and non-governmental African organizations to move together quickly and effectively in the performance of key operations, from peacekeeping to demobilization and retraining, from arms control and demining to humanitarian relief, and more.

The Right Question

"Today, connections among nations exist on so many levels that peace and prosperity are contagious. But so, too, are chaos and conflict. People everywhere will benefit from an Africa that is growing, developing strong institutions, and taking firm charge of its own destiny. But we also understand that the nature of the relationship and the rest of the world have changed.

It used to be that US policymakers, when they thought of Africa at all, would ask, what can we do for Africa, or what can we do about Africa? Today, the right question is what can we do with Africa to build on the progress that is being made and to encourage other nations to resolve conflicts and to move from authoritarian to more open economic and political systems."

Madeleine K. Albright
US Secretary of State
Testimony before the
Senate Finance Committee
June 17, 1998

In this framework, the United States has provided well over \$100 million to the Military Observation Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States and has strengthened the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) Conflict Management Center. The Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) has trained and equipped battalion-sized contingents from seven countries for peacekeeping. US support has also been crucial in strengthening subregional organizations, such as the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the Horn of Africa and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), that are now playing key roles in defusing sources of regional conflict and instability. Non-governmental organizations such as the African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), with US support, have emerged as indigenous powerhouses in developing the skills of actors at the local, national and continental levels to manage, research and facilitate the resolution of conflict situations.

In the six years since the enactment of ACRA, US agencies and their partners from African, international, and non-governmental organizations have achieved successes that have challenged the despair that has sometimes prevailed over intervention in conflicts in Africa. Despite severe problems in many countries, in recent years several major wars in Africa have been brought to a negotiated solution, and even short of full resolution, US intervention has helped contain conflicts that could have engulfed neighboring states. As Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice, referring to the US approach to the conflict in the Congo, puts it, "While comprehensive settlement is our ultimate objective, our immediate challenge is to set —and achieve—realistic intermediate targets that change the facts on the ground." What follows is a documentation of the achievements of ACRA in FY99.



Part I

Continent-Wide Initiatives

African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS)

The ACSS is geared to support democratic governance in Africa by offering senior African civilian and military leaders a rigorous academic and practical program in civilian-military relations, national security strategy and defense economics. In November 1999, the Center launched its inaugural seminar in Dakar, Senegal, after two years of careful consultation, planning and development.

The ACSS is conceived as the Department of Defense's (DOD) flagship engagement program for Africa. It is founded on DOD's regional center concept under which three institutes now operate: the George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany; the Asia-Pacific Center in Honolulu, Hawaii; and the Washington-based Center for Hemispheric Studies. To achieve its ends, the ACSS presents a substantive academic experience designed to:

- Promote informed and productive inquiry into the military's role in a democracy among senior government officials, non-government civilian leaders and military officers
- Foster, within the participant countries, an understanding of the military's role shaped and shared by the people, their governments and their military establishments
- Maintain long-term, continuing interaction with and amongst participants on matters relevant to the Center's mission
- Support additional research, seminars, conferences and other exchange activities on relevant topics in Africa, Europe and the United States.

The educational program consists of rotating seminars at different locations in Africa and the United States. These seminars include a Senior Leader Seminar for generals, flag officers and executive-level civilians, and a Leadership Seminar for senior field grade officers and civilian managers. Participants represent an approximately even mix of civilian and military leaders from African states across the continent. An international faculty of academics and policy experts facilitate small group discussions. The discussion-based approach helps to make use of the expertise of leaders from established African democracies to maximize participant-to-participant learning.

The ACSS aims ultimately to help African policy makers develop their own solutions to a challenge every democracy faces - how to reconcile the need for security with the desire for liberty. Over the course of the seminar, participants derive lessons and develop analytical tools to help meet that challenge. The curriculum is divided into the following three key areas:

- Civil-military relations
- National and regional security strategies
- Defense economics.

The DOD has developed the ACSS, from its inception, in conjunction with US Unified Commands, representatives from the governments and militaries of African nations, regional

organizations, and African missions to the UN, interested academics and Africa experts, NGOs, and the private sector. Several European governments have contributed ideas, financing and technical support. Seminars on the African continent rely heavily on input and support from the host governments.

African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)

ACRI is President Clinton's training initiative intended to enhance the capacity of selected African countries to respond professionally to peacekeeping and humanitarian relief contingencies on the continent. ACRI seeks to create effective, rapidly deployable units that can operate jointly. The training program is based on a common peacekeeping doctrine and a baseline of non-lethal equipment will foster a higher degree of inter-operability among African militaries. Observance of human rights and established rules of engagement are reinforced throughout the training program, which incorporates a briefing on HIV/AIDS in the military in all training events. The initiative is coordinated with and complements the training efforts of several other African and non-African nations and organizations, including the UK, France, Belgium, the Organization for African Unity and the United Nations.

The ACRI Interagency Working Group has identified equipment and training requirements for working with selected democratic African partners over a 3-5 year period, leading to self-sustainability on the part of African peacekeeping contingents. For FY 1999, the battalion-training schedule was as follows:

- Benin: October - December, 1998
- Mali: November - December, 1998
- Ghana: March - April, 1999
- Senegal: April - May, 1999
- Mali: May - June, 1999
- Benin: August - September, 1999
- Malawi: September - October, 1999

Six months after initial battalion training, follow-on training begins and continues every six months for two and a half years. Follow-on training allows a progressive building-block process and emphasis on enhancing command and control for battalion and subordinate company level leadership. Training is based on the "train-the-trainer" concept. The methodology combines classroom, field and computer-assisted simulation training.

Throughout the process the host military is exposed to the full range of UN Chapter VI peacekeeping tasks, but not to the combat aspects of Chapter VII peace enforcement, lethal training or equipment. ACRI's program integrates non-

ACRI in Action

Deployment of ACRI-trained troops is a sovereign decision of the ACRI partner in response to a request from international political entities such as the UN, OAU, or subregional organizations such as ECOWAS or SADC. ACRI-trained troops from Senegal, Malawi, Mali, and Uganda have participated in several multinational peacekeeping exercises in Africa. Furthermore, several ACRI-trained countries have been involved in recent regional peacekeeping operations or humanitarian emergencies:

- Senegal deployed troops to the Central African Republic to support MISAB and, later, the UN-sanctioned MINURCA.
- A full Ghanaian battalion was deployed to Sierra Leone as part of the ECOWAS peacekeeping force in February 1999.
- Benin deployed 147 troops to Guinea-Bissau in February 1999 to participate in ECOMOG-sanctioned peacekeeping, and is ready to play a peacekeeping role in Sierra Leone if needed.
- Mali deployed one battalion under ECOMOG control to Sierra Leone in February 1999, and was prepared to deploy one company to Guinea-Bissau.

governmental organizations, private voluntary organizations and international organizations into the training and works toward continued association with other African peacekeeping contingents.

In September 1999, Secretary Albright met with foreign ministers of ACRI partner countries during the United Nations General Assembly. The Ministers expressed great satisfaction with the ACRI program and encouraged continued ACRI support for Africa's subregional peacekeeping capacity.

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)

A key US priority is alleviating the devastation caused by small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) in Africa. In 1998-1999, ACDA pressed a number of policy initiatives and activities to foster arms control in Sub-Saharan Africa. In coordination with other relevant US agencies, ACDA supported a United Nations African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFRI) program to survey the small arms legislation, regulations and law enforcement capacities of African countries. This survey will provide a benchmark for future work in efforts to harmonize firearms and border control laws and procedures in Africa. Another element of the UNAFRI project, which will draw on ideas from African countries, will be the development of an Africa-based center or clearinghouse for technical information and violations reports.

ACDA led efforts to: (1) introduce and promote the concept of voluntary moratoria on arms transfers to regions of conflict in Africa in the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (WA); (2) encourage WA members to strictly observe and enforce UN arms sanctions regimes; and (3) adopt national legislation, where needed, to enforce and strengthen controls on arms flows to embargoed regions in Africa.

ACDA continued to compile data for publication of the internationally acclaimed World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers report. This publication contains extensive country-level and aggregate data on worldwide military expenditures, armed forces, arms imports and exports, and other relevant indicators. ACDA also supported arms control efforts undertaken by ECOWAS and SADC, which are discussed in the entries on those organizations.

In April 1999, the ACDA ceased to exist as an independent agency, becoming an integral part of the State Department's Bureau of Political Military Affairs. The administrative restructuring was deemed as an opportunity to move international arms control to a central position in US foreign policy.

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

COMESA promotes peace and security in the region as part of its goal to form a large economic and trading unit. To this end, USAID supports a COMESA Conflict Quick Response Fund (CQUIK) and a Conflict Pilot Activity Fund (CPAF) that provide sub-grants to US and African NGOs to conduct activities related to erupting conflicts in the Greater Horn of Africa region (Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi). Proposals are accepted from membership organizations, professional associations, community-based associations, non-governmental organizations, as well as inter-governmental and international organizations. The CPAF finances pilot activities that promote medium and longer-

term approaches to conflict prevention, rather than short-term responses to crises, in the following areas:

- Strengthening the ability of indigenous organizations to respond to conflict
- Supporting effective regional mechanisms to respond to conflict
- Testing pilot activities in response to conflict.

USAID also supported building the capacity of COMESA's Court of Justice and the development of a Protocol for Peace and Security in the COMESA region. The member states mandated the COMESA Secretariat to develop this at the May 1999 meeting in Nairobi. USAID supported the participation of two senior African consultants, as well as workshops and research activities to help draft a protocol that would be developed and approved collaboratively by member state representatives before being brought to ministers of state and state leaders for approval.

Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities Initiative (EIPC)

This initiative of the Departments of Defense and State seeks to promote common standards for peacekeeping doctrine, training and education at the institutional level. EIPC provides Foreign Military Financing funds to selected countries to achieve this goal. The program helps recipients develop their capabilities to field more efficient and better-led peacekeeping units, capable of taking on the toughest peacekeeping assignments. The result will be reduced likelihood and expense of future US involvement in peacekeeping operations, while helping to ensure that the US has effective coalition partners when national interests dictate involvement. EIPC is not an entitlement program; countries receiving funding in one fiscal year are not guaranteed funding in following years.

South Africa was among the ten countries selected in FY99, based on its stated interest in playing a more active future regional peacekeeping role and its ambitious three-phase peacekeeping training and educational development program. Under phase I of the program plan, developed in coordination with the South African National Defense Force, South Africa sent officers on an orientation tour of the US in August 1999 to familiarize them with available training and stimulation equipment for peace operations training. Assessment teams and US training will help South Africa design its program and curriculum.

International Military and Education Training (IMET)

Worldwide, IMET provides one of the most economical and effective uses of DOD funds in the long term by supporting self-sufficient, professional military forces. IMET is a low-cost, highly efficient component of US security assistance that provides training on a grant basis to military personnel from allied and friendly nations.

Over half a million foreign personnel, including several thousand Africans, have been trained through IMET sponsorship over the past three decades. By attending IMET-sponsored courses and programs in the United States, future leaders of foreign defense and related establishments are exposed to US values, regard for human rights, democratic institutions, and the role of a professional military under civilian control. To meet the challenges posed by recent transitions to democracy in countries throughout the world, IMET has been expanded to include programs focusing on human rights, defense resource management, military justice and civil-military relations.

Other in-country programs also contribute to US national objectives in Africa. The US Navy Justice School conducts programs on military law, respect for human rights and the role of the military in a democracy. Expanded IMET programs also provide this type of exposure. For example, training has been designed to create a learning environment to facilitate the host nation's playing a positive role in the democratization process.

Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

IGAD's priority areas are: 1) food security and environmental protection; 2) political and humanitarian affairs, including conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution; and 3) regional economic cooperation. The Authority has a leadership role in the pursuit of conflict resolution in Sudan. In 1999, USAID assisted IGAD's establishment of a Nairobi-based secretariat to oversee the Sudan peace talks.

In October 1999, US Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright conducted a six-nation tour of Sierra Leone, Mali, Nigeria, Guinea, Kenya and Tanzania. In Kenya, Albright met with the Kenyan envoy for the IGAD peace process for Sudan, Daniel Mboya, with the chairman of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), John Garang, and representatives of Sudanese civil society. During her visit, Secretary Albright expressed strong US government commitment to the IGAD peace process and announced a two-year extension of the USAID-funded Sudan Transitional Assistance for Rehabilitation (STAR) program and expansion to opposition-held areas in northern and eastern Sudan.

The US has led efforts by the international donor community to revitalize the IGAD peace process. Enhancements to the process have included establishment of the full time secretariat, appointment of Mr. Mboya to move the process forward, and creation of technical committees for the key issues under negotiation.

Organization of African Unity (OAU)

In FY99 the US provided support to the Panel of Eminent Persons on the Rwanda Genocide, and endeavors to end the fighting between Ethiopia and Eritrea, including the implementation of the OAU Framework Agreement for resolution of the border dispute. The OAU's Technical Arrangements for implementation of the Framework Agreement were accepted by Eritrea and placed under review by Ethiopia. Ethiopia requested clarifications of the Technical Arrangements and the OAU provided responses that Ethiopia was reviewing. The US worked actively with the OAU and the United Nations to move the peace process forward and help secure a cease-fire and implementation of the Framework Agreement. In July 1999, the US welcomed the initial positive responses by Eritrea and Ethiopia to the OAU's Framework Agreement.

Progress was also made at the OAU's inter-island conference on Comoros held in Antananarivo, Madagascar, during the week of April 19, 1999. The conference was a positive step toward stability and security for Comoros. The US urged the leaders of the secessionist movement on the island Anjouan to accept the OAU proposal and enter into discussions with the government of Comoros. The government of Mauritius merited special thanks for its efforts on behalf of the regional states to achieve a fair and peaceful solution to the Anjouan question. The US commended the OAU for its persistence in identifying an equitable formula acceptable to both parties.

The US also urged the parties involved in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to begin national dialogue under a neutral facilitator and work with the OAU-appointed chairman of the Joint Military Commission on the modalities for military disengagement.

State Department Political Military Affairs Bureau (PM)

On April 1, 1999, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) was fully integrated with the Department of State, in accordance with the Foreign Affairs Agencies Consolidation Act of 1998. This reorganization brought to the Political Military Affairs (PM) Bureau an expanded mandate in the area of regional security and confidence and security building measures (CSBMs).

Recognizing the serious issue of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SA/LW), the PM is developing and promoting efforts to collect, destroy and secure stockpiling such weapons. The Bureau initiated or planned to initiate efforts with the UN Disarmament Center in Lomé, Togo, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Organization of African Unity and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) to foster an African political commitment to combat illicit trafficking in SA/LW, to destroy them once collected, and to secure state stocks. This initiative complements PM's previous program to assist African states with the destruction of excess conventional arms.

PM has also sought opportunities to engage in political-military dialogue with key African countries. Establishing such talks is intended to open new opportunities for the US to encourage regional peacekeeping, reconciliation, and confidence and security in Africa.

US-Africa Ministerial: Partnership for the Twenty First Century

President William Jefferson Clinton addressed the opening plenary of the first-ever US-Africa Ministerial Conference, one year after his historic trip to Africa. The Conference was held in March 1999 at the US Department of State. Ministers of foreign affairs, trade and finance from 46 African states joined eight US Cabinet members and four US Agency heads in a joint discussion on how the African countries and US could best collaborate to accelerate Africa's full integration into the global economy. To this end, the participants addressed a broad range of issues, including conflict resolution.

USIS: *Africa Journal*

The US Information Service (USIS) television program *Africa Journal* includes topics that support various conflict resolution efforts across the continent. Available on satellite and broadcast by African stations in English and French, this program provides a forum and mass audience for policy makers to discuss key issues.

During FY99, seven episodes of *Africa Journal* addressed conflict-related issues:

- ECOWAS (December 1998)
- Conflict in the Horn (April 1999)
- Arms Control and the Military in Africa (June 1999)
- US Assistance in Kosovo: Why Not Africa? (July 1999)
- War in Sudan (July 1999)
- Combating Terrorism One Year After the Bombings (September 1999)
- Negotiating Peace (September 1999)

Voice of America (VOA)

VOA broadcasts in English, French, Hausa, Amharic, Afan Oromo, Tigrigna, Portuguese and Swahili. Besides providing balanced, quality news, the service broadcasts feature stories dealing with conflict resolution and topics related to the process of democratization. International broadcasters counterbalance Africa's preponderance of state-controlled, government-operated stations, especially in the area of presenting accurate, comprehensive and timely news coverage.

VOA has many examples, on a daily basis, of stories covering a range of points of view of major segments of the population that would have been silenced if it were not for VOA and other international broadcasters. Many representatives of governments, major political parties, ethnic groups and warring factions have sent messages to VOA's African Division, recognizing and often praising its role in promoting conflict resolution and peace. During FY99, this recognition was also expressed in other forms:

- *English to Africa* reporter Shaka Ssali obtained exclusive interviews with three key players in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) during a tour of Eastern and Central Africa - Congolese President Laurent Kabila, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and the main power figure in Rwanda, then Vice President Paul Kagame. Other media have tried and failed to reach these individuals, who held significant power in the mineral-rich region. However, Mr. Ssali is well known in the area and has a substantial audience. It was largely his reputation as a VOA journalist that enabled him to succeed in getting these leaders to talk in depth about the situation in their countries and prospects for ending fighting in the region. All of these officials noted they are regular listeners to VOA and depend on the *English to Africa* service to provide vital news and information.
- *English to Africa* reporter Josephine Kamara was presented the Hall of Fame Award for Sierra Leoneans living in the United States. The award was presented in Washington on October 8, 1999, in recognition of Ms. Kamara's reporting on war and peace in Sierra Leone.
- *English to Africa* reporter Richard Kotey was nominated for Ghana's National Millennium Excellence Award. The award is presented to outstanding Ghanaians.
- VOA *Hausa Service* was honored by one of Nigeria's premier institutions of higher learning, Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria. The *Hausa Service* was recognized for its efforts in informing and educating, and for leading other like stations as pacesetters in translating modern terms into Hausa.
- VOA Luanda (*Portuguese Service*) correspondent Josefa Lamberg was a featured speaker in Johannesburg, South Africa, sponsored by the *The Sowetan* newspaper in celebration of Media Freedom Week. Ms. Lamberg, of VOA's Portuguese Angola Project, described the hardships she and her colleagues face on a daily basis. She said, "I am thirty-four years old and there has always been war in my country. The government has always sought the means to silence the media —fifteen journalists have been murdered in the last twenty years and more than fifty arrested— for doing their job." Ms. Lamberg was severely beaten by members of the Angolan armed forces in February 1999 while covering mandatory conscription in Luanda for VOA's *Portuguese to Africa Angola Show*.
- The director of VOA's affiliate station in Niger, *Radio Anfani*, received an International League of Human Rights Award. US Ambassador Barbara Howell presented Gremah Boucar

with a cash prize of more than four thousand dollars in recognition of his struggle to keep broadcasts on the air. On several occasions, Mr. Boucar was arrested and jailed by security forces as a result of his efforts to educate and inform the world about events in that West African country.

- As a reaction to a *Central Africa Service* weekly panel discussion, *This Sunday Night* host and moderator Francois Nsengiyumva received a telephone call from the Rwandan President of Parliament, Hon. Joseph Sebarenzi. Mr. Sebarenzi wanted to extend his appreciation for *Central Africa Service's* coverage of events in the region and especially for allowing diversity of opinion in panel discussions.
- The main opposition political party in Burundi, FRODEBU (Burundi Democratic Front) sent compliments and warm words of support to VOA *Kirundi-Kinyarwanda Service* for its efforts to provide accurate information to the Great Lakes Region of Africa. In a letter to VOA, the leader of FRODEBU, Dr. Jean Minani, said the political debate on Burundi initiated by VOA *Kirundi-Kinyarwanda Service* has greatly contributed to the peace process in the country. *Kirundi-Kinyarwanda Service* has also received supporting messages from Burundi government officials, as well as from former presidents Jean Baptiste Bagaza and Sylvestre Ntibantunganya.

Part II

Central Africa

Burundi

The US was deeply concerned by the surge in violence in Burundi in the summer of 1999. The Department of State supported the appointment of former South African President Nelson Mandela as the facilitator of the peace talks in Arusha, Tanzania, and encouraged those participating to stay the course of dialogue and reconciliation.

In August 1999, the US government condemned all attacks against civilians, following credible reports of attacks by the Burundian army in Bujumbura. The US called on the government of Burundi to take prompt legal action against offenders and ensure that human rights organizations and others would be allowed to carry out independent investigations.



In FY99, USAID continued to support Burundian NGOs working towards improving the justice system and rule of law. Efforts focused on increasing communication and understanding among the various communities in Burundi. Activities included promoting the empowerment of women and using radio to promote civic education and to ensure that unbiased information was available to Burundians. USAID also moved to assist NGOs focused on improving the formal Burundian system of justice, and to support increased economic empowerment, inclusion and justice at the community level, especially in rural areas of Burundi. USAID also supported efforts undertaken by the Nyerere Foundation to assist in the Burundi reconciliation efforts.

Chad

The United States has played a key role in launching the Chad demining program that began in January 1998. Since the start of US funding, a national Mine Action Center (MAC) has been established, the collection of historical data pertaining to minefield locations has begun, and demining equipment has been provided. In February 1999, US military instructors graduated a cadre of 40 deminers, adding to a previously trained contingent of 65 Chadian engineering personnel. At the Chadian government's request, the US has also funded the renovation of the National Demining Office (NDO) building.

Congo, Democratic Republic of (DRC)

The US continued to support regional efforts to achieve a political solution to the DRC conflict, and remained in close contact with countries in the region to achieve this end.

Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice and National Security Council Senior Director for Africa Gayle Smith led a US delegation to the region in October and November of 1998. They met with all parties in the conflict and urged them to implement the agreements articulated in the Pretoria, Addis Ababa, and Lusaka communiqués to achieve a cease-fire.

The US has also consistently called for a withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In November 1998, the US expressed deep concern about reports of the movement of Rwandans sheltered by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) into the DRC from the Central African Republic and Congo-Brazzaville.

In May 1999, the US welcomed the Rwandan government's declaration of a unilateral cessation of hostilities in the DRC and urged other parties to the conflict to reciprocate by (1) refraining from further offensive operations, (2) redoubling their efforts to reach an agreement on a cease-fire and (3) the withdrawal of foreign troops.

In July 1999, the US welcomed the cease-fire agreement signed in Lusaka, Zambia by the state parties to the conflict. (These were necessary, but minor developments.)

The US welcomed the August signing of the agreement to end the war by the rebel groups. The US expressed its belief that swift and unconditional implementation of the Lusaka accords was essential, urged the Congolese parties to begin national dialogue under a neutral facilitator and work with the OAU-appointed chairman of the Joint Military Commission on the modalities for military disengagement. It also restated its commitment to human rights and the territoriality of the Congo, and congratulated the governments of Zambia and South Africa for their leadership in the region.

USAID initiated several activities designed to engage the Congolese society in talking about how to achieve sustainable peace and reconciliation. To support civil society's capacities for dialogue, USAID funded:

- A national civil society forum on peace
- A national debate on the future of peace in the DRC
- Training of 750 people in promoting peace, democracy, and development
- A coalition of youth groups in the Kivus region

For Territorial Integrity & Against Violence in The Democratic Republic Of the Congo

The US consistently called for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of all foreign forces, an end to ethnic violence, respect for human rights, and the safety of civilians, humanitarian relief workers, and other non-combatants in the DRC. It repeatedly urged all sides to halt further offensive action and pursue immediate negotiations to resolve the underlying causes of the conflict: security concerns of the DRC's neighbors, and lack of broad-based participation in the political process and of full rights for all ethnic groups.

The US unequivocally supported the territorial integrity of the DRC and condemned any violation of this fundamental principle of both the United Nations Charter and the Organization of African Unity.

It also condemned the DRC government's efforts to recruit and train insurgent groups motivated by ethnic hatred, such as the Interhamwe (Hutu extremist militia) and the former Rwandan Armed Forces (ex-FAR) involved in the conflict. Reports indicated that these groups were being actively recruited to join armed factions fighting in the DROC, thereby exacerbating tensions in the already destabilizing conflict. A significant part of these groups were believed to be ex-FAR and Interhamwe leaders implicated in the 1994 genocide; they represent a dangerous element in the region.

- Public education about the Congo crisis as part of a medical relief program for refugees
- Preparation for women to be involved in peace discussions and negotiations.

Congo, Republic of (Congo-Brazzaville)

The US welcomed statements made in August 1999 by the Republic of Congo Ambassador to France regarding initial contacts to establish negotiations with political leaders in exile. The US also welcomed statements made by the exiled opposition endorsing the initiative and indicating their willingness to participate. It urged all parties to cooperate in seeking a negotiated settlement that would end the violence, restart the democratic transition, assure respect for human rights and humanitarian law, and permit economic development.

Rwanda

April 6th marked the fifth anniversary of the onset of one of the Rwandan genocides. The US extended its condolences to the government and people of Rwanda at this time of national mourning and remembrance. The US commended the government of Rwanda for the significant steps that it had taken to heal, reconcile and rebuild the nation. The previously held local elections in Rwanda were identified as one example of its efforts to foster a stronger sense of national unity.

A USAID participatory rural development project active in five of Rwanda's twelve prefectures included activities to promote community dialogue. Meanwhile, the basic infrastructure (telephone and cable installation) was laid for a satellite Internet connection and computer resource center at the National University of Rwanda in Butare, which will aid the Conflict Management Center in researching and promoting peace issues.

USAID continued to assist the Rwandan National Demining Office (NDO), which it had helped establish, by providing training of military personnel in techniques for demining and disposing of unexploded ordnance. With US assistance between 1995 and 1999, the NDO cleared roughly 50 percent of the land previously designated as "compromised" by land mines and unexploded ordnance; more than 7 million km² have been cleared, including 600 km of bush roads. In addition, 200,000 internally displaced persons have been allowed to return to their villages and homes.

One of USAID's largest projects in Rwanda was with the Ministry of Justice. This project focused mainly on public awareness campaigns surrounding the administration of justice, particularly *gacaca*, a new approach to process the enormous genocide caseload. Loosely based on traditional justice methods in Rwanda, *gacaca* involves remanding accused genocide perpetrators to local custody, to be judged by the communities where they allegedly committed their crimes. Those accused of the most egregious offenses continue to be prosecuted through the regular formal judicial system. The justice project focused on soliciting public opinion on these legal processes and helping ensure such input could be accommodated in the final law on *gacaca*. In addition, USAID hired a range of consultants to build the Ministry's capacity to administer justice through various personnel training programs and also provided commodity support to these activities. USAID also worked with the US Department of Justice on strengthening the Rwandan legal system, particularly those institutions responsible for prosecuting the most serious offenders. USAID also funded the training of approximately 75 Anglophone lawyers per semester at the National University, as well as a Rwandan student's doctoral research on the sociopolitical roots of the 1994 genocide.

The State Department's Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) contributed considerable amounts of money to UNHCR, UNDP and several NGOs for the repatriation and reintegration of some 2.4 million old and new caseload Rwandan refugees from 1996-1998. Concerned about the polarization of the Hutu and Tutsi populations in Rwanda shortly after the return of the refugees, and in order to ensure that the reintegration of the refugees would be sustainable, PRM continued to invest in FY99 in two projects focused on reconciliation and peace building. These were relatively modest contributions as PRM's mandate is to fund programs that protect and assist refugees and returnees.

PRM is co-funding Catholic Relief Services' (CRS) Peacebuilding Among Rwandan Youth, a three-year program begun in 1998 in four prefectures in Rwanda. The program targets some 26,000 youth from 13 to 25 years old, including 21,000 secondary school children, 1,200 youth leaders and "animators," 3,200 youth camp participants and 2,000 university students. The overall goal of the program is to contribute to the establishment of an environment conducive to national reconciliation. The emphasis is on educating youth in matters of justice, peace and reconciliation by developing appropriate curricula and other materials to be used in formal and informal educational settings. Some of the vehicles for delivering the message are schools, youth camps, small discussion groups, training of community leaders, and university conferences. CRS works closely with the Rwandan Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture, the Ministry of Education, the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, the National Youth Council and the Dioceses of the Catholic Church.

The government of Rwanda petitioned the US government for assistance with its curriculum development and teacher training programs. Although this is generally considered to be development-oriented, PRM argued that it could participate in this undertaking by persuading the Rwandan government to include a peace building and conflict resolution component into the technical areas. In 1998, PRM funded UNICEF to place a technical advisor with the Rwandan Department of Education. Due to personnel changes in the Ministry of Education, progress was slow the first year. In 1999, the Technical Advisor assisted the Ministry in developing Rwanda's educational system and in the development of curriculum and teacher training modules to include conflict resolution and peace building components.

In December 1998, the US Information Service (USIS) organized an extensive program for the visit to Rwanda of Dr. Michael Brown of Georgetown University's National Security Studies Program. Dr. Brown's lecture on *International Response to Ethnic Conflict* at USIS drew a former Minister of State, representatives from the Defense Ministry and Foreign Ministry, academics, journalists and other highly influential Rwandans. USIS also arranged a full program of interviews for Dr. Brown, who was visiting Rwanda to conduct research for a new book on the role of political leaders in ethnic conflict. Through USIS, Dr. Brown met with Rwanda's Prime Minister during a session that stretched to 90 minutes (from the scheduled 30), and with representatives of Rwanda's political parties, Parliament and the Ministry of Justice.

USIS arranged for US Ambassador George Staples and USAID acting director Dr. David Hess to be interviewed on TV Rwanda's *Guest of the Week* talk show in February 1999, seen by an estimated audience of about 10,000. Ambassador Staples emphasized the US position on the importance of a negotiated solution to the Congo conflict, and Dr. Hess described the significance and impact of USAID's demining program in Rwanda.

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Part III

Eastern Africa

Comoros

The US was pleased with the progress made at the Organization of African Unity's inter-island conference on Comoros held in Antananarivo, Madagascar, in April 1999. The conference was considered a positive step towards stability and security for the peoples of Comoros. The US urged the leaders of the secessionist movement on the island of Anjouan to accept the OAU proposal and enter into discussions with the government of Comoros.



Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Dispute

Former National Security Advisor Anthony Lake traveled to Ethiopia and Eritrea in November 1998 to pursue a peaceful resolution to the border dispute. He further consulted with US government officials and the United Nations in ongoing discussions in Addis Ababa and Asmara. At the request of President Clinton, Mr. Lake returned to the Horn of Africa in December 1998 to continue US efforts to help find a negotiated solution to the dispute. Mr. Lake led an interagency team in meetings with the leaders of the two nations.

The US urged both sides to exercise restraint and take no action that could increase tensions or provoke widespread hostilities. The US continued to believe that the dispute must be resolved through peaceful means as outlined in the OAU Framework Agreement.

In February 1999, the US deeply regretted the use of air power by Ethiopia in the conflict, in particular against economic targets and near civilian population centers. It urged the government of Ethiopia to resume the moratorium immediately. It also urged the Eritrean authorities to continue to uphold their commitment to the terms of the moratorium.

USIS continued to provide an extremely high degree of media support to US Ambassador David Shinn to articulate the US position calling for a peaceful settlement to the border dispute. For example, interviews were arranged with the Amharic weekly independent newspapers *Tobia* and *Mebrek* and the ruling party-affiliated *Walta (Axis) Information Center*, which placed the interview on its Web site. In each case, the Ambassador described the “road map” for a peaceful settlement of the Ethiopian-Eritrean border dispute and delivered a constructive message about the continuity of US-Ethiopian links despite political strains. Additionally, USIS arranged “backgrounders” for the embassy with *The Economist* and VOA that dealt with the breaking news of April 1999 that Ethiopia was prepared to accept a cease-fire, contingent only on an Eritrean promise to withdraw from occupied territories. USIS also arranged several interviews in April

1999 in which Ambassador Shinn delivered a strong, unambiguous message about American neutrality in the border conflict. In addition to a radio interview with the US-based *One Ethiopia*, which reaches a large number of Ethiopians in the US, Ambassador Shinn did a forty-minute interview with Ethiopian TV broadcasted in April 1999 to a potential viewership of five million, not including an undetermined audience in Eritrea. The monthly *Tobia* ran a guest editorial in its April issue defending the US position of neutrality; significantly, Ambassador Shinn had given an interview to the Amharic version of this publication the previous month.

In July 1999, the US welcomed the initial, positive responses by Eritrea and Ethiopia to the OAU's Framework Agreement.

USAID contributed to a multi-donor trust fund to carry out a border demarcation exercise along the disputed border.

Ethiopia

As part of its US speaker program, in November 1998 USIS arranged for former US Ambassador John McDonald to conduct a five-day workshop on conflict resolution in Ethiopia. Mr. McDonald's presentations on citizen diplomacy, delegate skills for participation in international conferences, and national negotiating styles were highly relevant to Ethiopia's situation, which is characterized by potentially explosive regional and domestic disputes. The workshop had a high-level audience, including representatives from eleven ministries, the Prime Minister's office, four MPs and the head of the Department of Political Science of Addis Ababa University. The media carried two feature-length articles on the workshop and two extended interviews with Mr. McDonald.

In May 1999, University of Florida Professor René Lemarchand completed two days of programs for USIS in Abidjan. The professor emeritus and former USAID consultant spoke at the American Cultural Center on regional conflicts in Africa, most notably in the region of the Great Lakes, before an audience of graduate students. Dr. Lemarchand also discussed the process of democratization in Africa at the American Cultural Center before an audience of politicians, activists and magistrates, and at the National School of Administration before a group of senior civil servants. The independent newspaper *Le Jour* also carried a two-page interview with Dr. Lemarchand on subjects related to the process of democratization in Africa.

USAID provided funding for an Ethiopian Youth League Conference on Conflict Resolution, Prevention and Mitigation. Support was also extended to an Ethiopian NGO, the Peace and Development Committee, for establishing mediation centers and training in conflict settlement for court clerks, local officials, judges, police, traditional leaders and others. Another program assisted workshops for conflict mediation and dispute resolution with participation of 13 NGOs.

In the area of demobilization, USAID provided emergency resources to vulnerable groups and to demobilized soldiers, internally displaced persons and war returnees. These funds supported resettlement and reintegration programs to assist ex-soldiers with their transition to civilian life. Support was also provided to Ethiopian NGOs working with war-affected youth to help trace and reunite family members, provide education and training for orphans, and carry out other important efforts.

Kenya

During FY99, USAID supported numerous activities to build the capacities of Kenyan NGOs for peace building and conflict resolution. Efforts undertaken with USAID support included:

- Peace education in Kaikippia district, which has experienced persistent ethnic violence since 1997
- Initiatives to improve security in conflict-prone districts of northern Kenya
- Peace building and conflict resolution activities in Nakuru and Laikipia districts
- Public workshops and distribution of peace materials in Rift Valley Province, which helped to mitigate tension in an area that has experienced ethnic violence since 1992
- Training and public education about human rights, and the establishment of a pool of community-based human rights defenders
- Establishing and building the capacity of 600 justice and peace coalitions throughout the country
- Peace building activities among women in Rift Valley Province
- Peace building activities among youth in Eastern and Rift Valley Provinces
- A project to establish a community-based early warning and rapid response mechanism involving local leaders, elders, religious leaders and others
- Seminars targeted at local leaders in northern Kenya, designed to promote democracy and prevent conflict among pastoralists
- A project to assist pastoral areas in participating in the anticipated constitutional reform and Kenya Constitutional Review Commission. (The marginalization of pastoralist communities has been a source of actual and potential violent conflict in Kenya)
- Church-based seminars on peace building and conflict resolution
- A symposium of Members of Parliament from northern Kenya to formulate strategies for peace and security on the Kenya-Uganda border
- Research on the nature and sources of current and potential conflict in Kenya.

Sudan

The US supported the agreement by the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) to extend until June 1999 a cease-fire in Bahr el Ghazal Province, the area most affected by humanitarian disaster. The cease-fire, which had been in place since July 1998, was crucial in permitting the delivery of relief supplies to victims of famine. The US urged that the cease-fire be a step toward ending the civil war in Sudan.

In May 1999, the government of Sudan bombed the towns of Akak and Nyamel in Bahr el Ghazal. A World Food Program team was in Akak at the time preparing to distribute relief food. In July 1999, the US House of Representatives unanimously approved a resolution condemning the government of Sudan for conducting a genocidal war in southern Sudan, supporting terrorism, and violating human rights.

In July 1999, Sudan's warring parties agreed to implement enhancements to the peace process conducted by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The US welcomed the agreement to establish an IGAD permanent secretariat in Nairobi, form technical committees for the key issues under negotiation, and appoint a special envoy to move the process forward. It was hoped that these enhancements would invigorate the IGAD peace process and ensure continuous, sustained negotiations and progress. The US pledged to provide financial and technical assistance to ensure the enhancements are effective in re-energizing the process.

In late July 1999, the US eased sanctions against Sudan, Iran and Libya. US companies are now allowed to obtain licenses from the US Treasury Department to sell food and medicine to these countries, previously listed as terrorist states.

In August 1999, President Clinton appointed Harry Johnston as special envoy for Sudan. Mr. Johnston is a former chairman of the Africa Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Mr. Johnston's mandate includes strengthening the IGAD peace process, pressing human rights improvements, and focusing the spotlight on humanitarian conditions in Sudan.

In September 1999, representatives of 13 US-based NGOs met with US Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright to press for a more robust US diplomatic effort in resolving the Sudanese conflict. Secretary Albright traveled to Africa in late October 1999. In Kenya, she met with the Kenyan envoy for the IGAD process, Daniel Mboya, with SPLM chairman John Garang, and representatives of Sudanese civil society. Secretary Albright expressed strong US Government commitment to the IGAD peace process and announced a two-year extension of the USAID-funded Sudan Transitional Assistance for Rehabilitation (STAR) program and expansion to opposition-held areas in northern and eastern Sudan.

The US humanitarian response to the emergency in Sudan is provided through USAID and the State Department's Bureau for Population, Refugee and Migration (PRM). In FY99, USAID funded the efforts of the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) to mediate the Dinka Nuer reconciliation process. The STAR program also provided over \$2 million to support capacity-building efforts in opposition-held areas. While most of these efforts were targeted at food security and basic needs, some did include conflict resolution components. Achievements under the STAR program included the Dinka-Nuer reconciliation in Wunlit, and a similar intra-Nuer reconciliation in Upper Nile, and a conference on lessons learned from the 1998 famine in Bahr el Ghazal.

Uganda

USAID provided assistance to meet the needs of communities in two districts of Northern Uganda victimized by attacks of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a Sudanese-backed rebel group largely made up of abducted children and youths. A project in Gulu district worked to support families and communities in recognizing and responding to the needs of children affected by armed conflict through structured activities involving rescued child soldiers and concubines along with other children in their communities. It also expanded the availability, quality and appropriateness of formal primary education, and provided apprenticeships and other forms of community-based, hands-on training for war-affected youth. A second project in neighboring Kitgum district is building community capacity to prevent and mitigate the most serious impacts of violence and displacement of children. Abducted children were received and reintegrated with their families, community leaders were trained, and sports, dance and drama events were developed around traditional cultural values and children's rights.

USAID also supported alternative basic education for the Karamoja region of northeastern Uganda, home to the Karimojong, a semi-nomadic ethnic group with a strong tradition of cattle raiding across clan and ethnic lines and the Kenyan border. While the primary goal was to support basic education for vulnerable children, culturally sensitive conflict resolution activities were included in the curricula.

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Part IV

Southern Africa

African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)

Based in South Africa, ACCORD's focus is on institutionalizing conflict resolution through intervention, education and training, research, and networking. It has instituted a Rapid Response Mechanism and an Early Warning Unit to facilitate early intervention in emerging conflict situations, and it trains different sectors in conflict resolution strategy, methods and systems through its Peacekeeping, Preventive Diplomacy, Public Sector, Youth, Gender and Tertiary Institutions Programs. Within the context of ACCORD's theme of finding African Solutions to African Challenges, USAID has provided support for a Public Sector Conflict Management Program geared to the development of institutional mechanisms in the public sector to deal with recurring conflict. The program's pilot was implemented in the KwaZulu-Natal Health Department with 40 people at the senior management and leadership level trained in basic and advanced conflict resolution, negotiation strategy, facilitation, and dispute systems design.



Labor Law Unit, University of Cape Town

USAID supported conflict and dispute resolution management initiatives at the University of Cape Town Labor Law Unit, which provides dispute and conflict resolution skills to labor movements and employers' organizations in Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. Its 12th Annual Labor Law Conference, held in July 1999, also had a training session focused on conflict management and gender issues in the workplace.

Southern African Development Community (SADC)

Established in 1980, SADC's current goals include achieving economic growth; alleviating poverty; promoting regional integration; evolving common political values, systems and institutions; promoting regional security; and using natural resources sustainably.

The SADC and US have established a regular dialogue, the US-SADC Forum, and convened an inaugural meeting in April 1999. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), which was integrated into State Department's Political Military Affairs Bureau (PM) that same month, was instrumental in initiating and coordinating a discussion at the Forum on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SA/LW), with particular emphasis on Southern Africa. The outcome of the discussion was a commitment by the US to provide Customs and Basic Firearms Enforcement

training to SADC countries to promote military transparency, confidence-building and regional arms control measures.

Angola

The resurgence of conflict in December 1998 produced hundreds of thousands of additional internally displaced persons, as both the National Union for Total Independence in Angola (UNITA) and the government of Angola continued to believe, erroneously, that a military victory was within their grasp. With neither side willing to engage in a political dialogue, the State Department urged the Angolan government to complement its military offensive with a “peace strategy” including a comprehensive program of economic and political reform and development to win the hearts and minds of the Angolan people. The Clinton Administration used a new forum, the US-Angola Bilateral Consultative Commission, to engage the government on the various facets of the peace strategy, including regional security issues, humanitarian relief, and an improved climate for trade, investment and economic development.

US officials continued to deplore UNITA’s repeated failure to comply with its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol, and made clear that this compliance is necessary to defuse the precarious security situation in Angola. At the same time, they reminded the Angolan government of its responsibility to create an environment conducive to national reconciliation and the development of a politically pluralistic society. They also called upon both UNITA and the government to desist from engaging in any actions that could further exacerbate tensions. In particular, the US Department of State urged both sides to recognize that a military solution to the conflict is not viable and that lasting peace in Angola could only come through a political settlement addressing the long-standing tensions between the two parties.

The US continued to support the flow of objective news and information in Angola via Voice of America (VOA) and other media, encouraging conflict resolution and reconciliation in the country. Through participation in the highly popular news program *Linha Directa*, *Linha Aberta*, US officials in Luanda and visiting senior Clinton Administration officials also focused attention on the need for the protection of human rights, press freedom and a political process that is inclusive of all parties, including those opposed to the governing Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) party.

USAID in Action in Angola

Although 1998 witnessed the collapse of the Lusaka Peace Protocol, the performance and results of USAID’s portfolio in Angola reflected a significant improvement in the capacity of USAID-assisted NGOs, both in terms of their administrative and advocacy capabilities. Some beneficiaries of USAID’s programs organized protest marches and demonstrations against the war.

To promote reconciliation opportunities among diverse groups in Angola, USAID continued to fund seminars and theatrical plays broadcast on television and radio to encourage understanding and communication between government and civil society. In opposition to the war, civil society organizations showed that concepts of conflict resolution, human rights, and freedom of expression were starting to be part of their vocabulary and actions. For example:

- NGOs in Benguela worked against the conscription of underage boys into the military using skills learned from USAID training programs
- Various political parties condemned the reversal back to war, while urging the two belligerent sides to negotiate a peaceful solution
- Some of the participants in USAID-funded activities formed the Group for the Reflection of Peace, a forum that proposed alternative ways of resolving the war.

Furthermore, a USAID institutional development project led to the creation of Forum of Angolan NGOs (FONGA). This coalition, which includes NGOs from different parts of the country, is evidence of increased tolerance and acceptance in civil society.

USAID has undertaken activities to assist Angola in fulfilling the terms of the Lusaka Protocol and 1994 peace agreements, as well as to rebuild civil society and promote a culture of tolerance and respect for human rights. During FY99, components of these efforts included training for human rights monitors, conflict mediators, parliamentarians, local government officials and political parties, as well as the general public. These seminars and training activities brought together hundreds of Angolans from diverse backgrounds in a climate that reinforced trust, respect and tolerance. One of the foci of the civic education workshops was approaches and techniques of conflict resolution.

USAID financed a radio program, *Voices of Reconciliation*, which brought journalists from both sides to work together for the first time in Angolan history, as well a radio broadcast series that included issues related to conflict management.

Malawi

In September 1999, a USIS press assistant served as the embassy facilitator for a US Defense Institute of International Legal Studies program in Malawi. Members of the Malawian military, government, NGOs and journalists attended the program designed to showcase the role of the military in civil society. USIS represented and promoted the program among journalists, who in Malawi are often distrustful of the military, and arranged a number of newspaper, radio and television interviews with instructors (primarily US military attorneys), as well as with some of the more than 30 participants. There were numerous stories in the local press, as well as editorials on lessons to be learned from the US on military and press relations.

Mozambique

USAID has continued to build partnerships and support the capacity of an array of NGOs, Mozambican universities, local governments, political parties, the parliament and the judiciary.

Mozambique has been receiving US humanitarian demining assistance since FY93. In 1999, The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) helped demine the Massingir Dam. Key to the country's overall development strategy, the dam is capable of supplying electricity and irrigating 9,000 hectares of land.

The US continued working with the National Demining Commission (CND) to increase its responsibility in overseeing all aspects of mine action, and to improve interaction and cooperation between the CND and NGOs. A US military training contingent has trained a cadre of army demining trainers, 100 of whom graduated in March 1999.

USAID's Demobilization/Reintegration Project continued with support for clearing roads and facilitating post-war resettlement of agricultural land. Another USAID contract has provided funding to support emergency evacuation assistance for land mine victims from the central region, and USAID's Senator Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund (WVF) is supporting production and maintenance of prosthetic devices. Thus far, 70 percent of the amputee population has been fitted with prosthetics manufactured by a US-funded NGO. With US support and progress to date, a growing sense is that, given enough time, Mozambique's land mine problem is a finite one.

Namibia

The US Embassy's Democracy and Human Rights Fund (DHRF) Program complemented USAID's Democracy and Governance program, which focused on strengthening government institutions such as parliamentary development. The DHRF works through NGOs and, in FY99, continued its focus on core priorities, including combating violence against women and children, fighting discrimination against the disabled, and protecting the rights and dignity of those afflicted by HIV/AIDS. DHRF also supported civic education activities in preparation for the November 30 and December 1, 1999 second post-independence elections.

US government assistance to Namibia's demining efforts through Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) funding has been an outstanding success. Since the US began its assistance in 1994, Namibia has seen a dramatic 90 percent reduction in the casualty rate. As of the end of June 1999, 141 barns had been cleared and 912 mines destroyed. Logistical support has also been provided for the clearance of unexploded ordnance. With continued assistance, Namibia will be able to proclaim itself "mine-safe" by the end of 2001, the first to do so among Africa's mine-affected countries.

South Africa

Defense Secretary William Cohen's trip to South Africa in February 1999 received favorable, high profile coverage across that country in both print and electronic media. South African media highlighted, among other things, US support for the scheduled Operation Blue Crane exercise (a Southern Africa Development Community military exercise), which in turn dovetailed with US goals promoting African peacekeeping.

The State Department led the US-South Africa Political-Military Dialogue in March 1999. This included productive discussions on a range of issues including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Anti-Personnel Land Mines, Regional Conflict Management, and Arms Transfer Policy and Export Controls (with a particular emphasis on small arms issues). From these talks, the US gained insight and a better understanding of South African views on small arms problems in southern Africa.

In recognition of South Africa's potential for participation in international peacekeeping, in FY99 that country was included for a second year in a row among countries around the world selected for funding under the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities Initiative.

USAID has undertaken numerous efforts to improve conflict resolution capacities of NGOs and other institutions in South Africa. In FY99, these efforts included:

- Support to four advice and justice centers that were involved in resolving disputes, primarily at the community level. These centers worked to provide direct dispute resolution services to disadvantaged constituencies. The Ministry of Justice also referred some cases to these centers to resolve them out of court. Much of the USAID support went to improve the capacity of the centers and provide training in conflict resolution to schools, NGOs, Community Police Forums, local and provincial government committees, and other organizations.
- Support to the African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) to strengthen conflict management capacities of the public sector through skills training to civil bureaucrats, new politicians and community representatives, and the establishment of a Mediation Forum at the provincial government level and a Metropolitan Council for handling

public policy disputes.

- Grants and capacity building to institutions working in conflict management, especially internal conflict at the local government level in Eastern Cape, Free State, Mpumalanga and Northwest Provinces.
- Capacity building of youth in KwaZulu/Natal, an area which suffers from high levels of political violence, to understand, prevent and mediate conflicts in their communities. This was achieved through youth training programs, school projects, and training of church leaders in conflict mediation and resolution as well as stress and trauma healing.

Swaziland

In June 1999, US Ambassador Alan McKee met with the national director of the Swaziland Red Cross Society to introduce members of the US Special Forces, who conducted a joint training program for demining in Swaziland later in the year. At the request of King Mswati III, the US military provided training and equipment to the Swazi Defense Force to clear land mines from areas adjacent to the Mozambican border. The activity was made possible through the US government's worldwide Humanitarian Demining Program (HDP).

International Visitor grantee Bongani Malaza told the Embassy that he would take what he learned from his June 1999 US exchange experience on "Conflict Resolution: Citizen Partnerships for Peace" and apply it to his Swazi youth volunteer programs. He also planned to talk about the topic of conflict resolution on Swazi radio.

In September 1999, USIS drew widespread media coverage when Major General Charles J. Wax, Director of the US European Command (EUCOM) Plans and Policy Directorate, visited Swaziland. EUCOM political advisor Ambassador Peter Chaveas accompanied General Wax. While in Swaziland General Wax and Ambassador Chaveas discussed a variety of military issues, including the country's participation in the Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), with the king and several of his senior advisors.

Zambia

The Director of the Zambian Military Academy used materials provided by the Embassy's Information Resource Center to develop new conflict resolution and peacekeeping curricula for the academy.

In March 1999, USIS sponsored a trip to Lusaka by Judge Mary Terrell of the Washington, D.C. Superior Court and Ms. Catherine Hall, an attorney specializing in dispute resolution, for a series of seminars and consultations as part of the U.S.-Africa Legal Exchange Program with the American Bar Association. The Chief Administrator of the Zambian courts, Philip Musonda, gave both speakers high marks for their presentations, which were tailored to audiences that included both magistrates and a mixed group of attorneys and businesspeople. The focus on mediation and non-litigious dispute resolution was particularly apt for the magistrates, whose caseload has recently increased substantially.

Zimbabwe

USIS speaker Judge LaJune Lange of Minnesota spoke in August 1999 on domestic violence and was a resource person on gender issues at a workshop for high court judges. As part of the Office

of Citizen Exchange-funded League of Women Voters (LWV) program, two Cleveland LWV officers spoke in Harare and Bulawyo in September on running peaceful elections. Meanwhile, two Zimbabwean civil rights activists were awarded International Visitor grants for a program on conflict resolution.

In FY99, Zimbabwe continued to receive humanitarian demining assistance. The program focused on providing extensive training to improve the ability of the Zimbabweans to conduct demining operations. Funding in FY99 was also designated for mine awareness and the purchase of heavy equipment to support clearance operations.

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Part V

Western Africa

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

Heads of state of six ECOWAS nations met in Abuja, Nigeria, in September 1999 to discuss border frictions between Liberia and Guinea and plan a new meeting of the Mano River Union (Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone) to discuss mutual security issues. The US government applauded this regional initiative to resolve problems.


USAID supported ECOWAS efforts to draft a protocol on a regional conflict mechanism for peacekeeping as well as prevention, mitigation and resolution of conflict.

ECOWAS Military Observation Group (ECOMOG)

ECOMOG has played a key role in ending conflict throughout the West African region. Comprised of troops from several ECOWAS member-states, and bolstered by substantial logistical assistance from the United States and other donors, in FY99 ECOMOG was instrumental in disarming rebel factions and securing an environment favorable to conducting free elections in Guinea-Bissau. Almost 600 ECOMOG troops from Togo, Niger, the Gambia and Benin were deployed to Guinea-Bissau to enforce a cease-fire and support a peace agreement between belligerents.

More than 12,000 ECOMOG troops drawn from Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana and Mali, also served in Sierra Leone to protect the population from rebel depredations, defend the democratically elected government, and press the insurgents to the negotiating table. At the height of the conflict, the US was grateful to ECOMOG for their assistance in evacuating US citizens.

The United Nations reported that, in the heat of the battle to dislodge the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) from Freetown, ECOMOG and civilian vigilantes committed some summary executions of rebels and civilian collaborators. The US condemned these and all human rights violations and urged Nigeria, the ECOMOG contingent leader, to investigate and punish individuals responsible for these abuses. In response, the Nigerian government promptly reorganized the ECOMOG command structure and replaced the ECOMOG Force Commander with a graduate of the Military Policy Officer's Advanced Course (MPOAC) at Fort McClellan, Alabama.



The US views ECOMOG as a legitimate peacekeeping force with a mandate from the region and the democratically elected government of Sierra Leone, and with the support of the United Nations to restore stability and peace to Sierra Leone. The US worked multilaterally and bilaterally to strengthen ECOMOG's capacity to fulfill this mandate, providing critical nonlethal logistical assistance including communications and transportation equipment, as well as medical supplies and equipment to treat Nigerian troops wounded during the RUF offensive against Freetown. In addition, the US worked to improve coordination especially between ECOMOG and NGOs, to allow humanitarian aid to be dispersed quickly and effectively throughout the country.

Exercise Flintlock

Exercise Flintlock, a series of joint US military exercises training West African armed forces, concluded in May 1999 in Cote d'Ivoire. The exercises climaxed with a combined operation and several airborne drops of American, Ivorian, Ghanaian and Malian paratroops. This exercise, well covered in the regional press, demonstrated the continuing US commitment to regional stability in West Africa.

Trips by the Presidential Special Envoy for Democracy and Human Rights in Africa

Presidential Special Envoy for Democracy and Human Rights in Africa Reverend Jesse Jackson traveled to West Africa in November 1998. In Guinea, he facilitated a meeting among Presidents Ahmad Kabbah of Sierra Leone, Charles Taylor of Liberia, and Lansana Conte of Guinea - the Presidents of the West African Mano River States - to discuss mutual security issues and stability in the subregion. After a communiqué aimed at ending the fighting in Sierra Leone and Liberia was signed, Special Envoy Jackson continued to stress the need for political security to develop economic stability and for resolving conflicts by negotiation rather than confrontation. Rev. Jackson has also brokered meetings between rival ethnic groups in the Niger Delta, brokered a cease-fire in Sierra Leone, and helped persuade President Taylor of Liberia to destroy a large arms cache. Throughout his travels in West Africa, Rev. Jackson underscored that stability and greater economic prosperity were contingent upon the cooperation of the region's leaders.

Ghana

During his November 1998 trip to West Africa, Presidential Envoy Reverend Jesse Jackson visited Ghana. While there, he met with President Jerry Rawlings and representatives of civil society to discuss democratization and peacekeeping issues.

Over the past several years, USIS has worked to create awareness of Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) in Ghana, using a range of program tools (speakers, grantees of the US International Visitors program, outreach, exchanges). Thanks in large part to those efforts, ADR is now firmly on the public agenda in Ghana. In April 1999, both the Attorney General and the Chief Justice of Ghana publicly expressed their support for ADR during their remarks at the opening of an International Bar Association conference in Accra.

Guinea-Bissau

Following reports of armed clashes in October 1998, the US urged all parties to the conflict in Guinea-Bissau to abide scrupulously by the terms of the cease-fire agreement brokered by the Community of Portuguese-Speaking States (CPLP) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It also appealed to the members of ECOWAS and the CPLP to redouble their efforts to bring both sides to the negotiating table at the earliest possible date, in the hope of restoring peace and stability to Guinea-Bissau.

The US commended the signing in November in Abuja of an agreement to lay out a framework for stability and peace in Guinea-Bissau. The agreement included commitments by both sides to respect the cease-fire, organize a government of national unity, and hold legislative and presidential elections. The agreement also called for the withdrawal of foreign troops and the simultaneous deployment of an Economic Community of West African States Military Observation Group (ECOMOG) interposition force. The US congratulated ECOWAS and the CPLP for the hard work they put into moving this peace process forward. It urged all parties to the conflict to abide strictly by the terms of the agreement.

In February 1999, the US deplored the renewed fighting in Guinea-Bissau and urged all sides to observe the peace agreement that had been signed in Abuja on November. It called on all combatants to immediately halt hostilities so that ECOWAS could resume deployment of its interposition force. The US also strongly urged both sides in the conflict to work together to ensure that a government of national unity be sworn in as quickly as possible. Such a government was inaugurated at the end of the month. The US commended all parties, particularly President Nino Vieira, ECOWAS and the CPLP in bringing about a peaceful conclusion to this conflict. It expressed hope that the new government of national unity would quickly begin to work effectively toward national reconciliation, economic recovery and the safe return of citizens displaced by the war.

Liberia

The State Department used its own diplomatic leverage and worked with regional allies to persuade Liberian President Charles Taylor to destroy thirty containers of weapons confiscated at the end of the Liberian civil war and stored at the ECOMOG base in Monrovia. Ambassador Howard F. Jeter, Presidential Special Envoy for Liberia, led a US delegation to Liberia to attend the Independence Day celebration in Monrovia in July 1999. At this ceremony, President Taylor finally agreed to destroy the weapons, a process that was completed by October 1999.

Ambassador Jeter also met with President Taylor to discuss his efforts to support the Sierra Leone Peace Accord, the human rights situation in Liberia, democratic reform, and progress on achieving an open, transparent government in which equitable economic growth and development could occur.

USAID funded several programs in Liberia designed to assist former child soldiers, young adults and ex-combatants in general. Through support to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), one project, funded under the Leahy War Victims Fund, provided trauma counseling, vocational skills training, literacy and reunification support services. Education supplies and equipment were distributed to primary school students under the same program.

A second program trained young adult (male and female) ex-combatants. Vocational training included auto mechanics, agriculture, electricity, masonry, tailoring and business education. Because of the success of the program, the World Bank has provided \$150,000 to purchase a

tractor for use by the ex-combatants in their agriculture program. In FY99, a democracy and governance component was added to the skills training program. Working in conjunction with the University of Liberia's Grimes Law School, a conflict resolution curriculum was developed to teach students the rights and responsibilities of citizenship and basic human rights training.

A similar skills training program for young adults, ages 17-24, was also supported by USAID. This program has institutionalized a family sensitization program focusing on the special needs of ex-fighters in rehabilitating them into society through visitations to homes, schools, churches, marketplaces, hospitals and rehabilitation centers operated by other non-governmental institutions. Nearly 10,000 ex-combatants and villagers have benefited from the sensitization program. Since its inception in 1996, the program has also assisted over 3,000 ex-combatants in skills training, trauma counseling and literacy.

The United Nations Office of Project Support (UNOPS), with funding from USAID, implemented a resettlement program in eight of Liberia's 13 counties. In 1999, UNOPS rehabilitated 113 schools, 62 clinics, 4 hospitals, 144 wells and 446 latrines. The project also implemented 66 community-based agricultural projects and conducted 18 community-based workshops in trauma counseling, community development and peace building. These projects targeted ex-combatants, internally displaced persons and returned refugees.

USAID supported *Star Radio*, which provided the people of Liberia with an independent source of information. In so doing, it sought to:

- Facilitate rebuilding a sense of citizenship, especially among those who have specially suffered violence, been internally displaced, or are refugees in Liberia
- Support the activities of NGOs having relations with countries affected by the war(s)
- Defend and promote human rights, the search for peace and pursuit of reconciliation.

Star Radio broadcasts from Monrovia in fourteen local languages: Bassa, Dan/Gio, Gbande, Gola, Grebo, Lorma, Kissi, Kpelle, Krah, Kru, Mandingo, Mende and Vai —as well as English. Formerly administered by an international NGO, the management of the station is now in the hands of an all-Liberian staff, with expatriate supervision. *Star Radio* originally broadcast in frequency modulation (FM) and short-wave (SW); the SW was revoked by the Liberian government in 1998 and remained suspended through FY99.

Mali

The US Embassy continued to encourage regional stability through support for development and economic integration. It worked to consolidate the peace process in the north of Mali, develop Malian peacekeeping capabilities and professionalize the armed forces. The development of peacekeeping capabilities and professionalization of the armed forces were advanced significantly in FY99 through the Department of Defense's programs of International Military Education and Training (IMET), Expanded International Military Education and Training (E-IMET), Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCET).

USAID efforts to build the capacity of Malian non-governmental and community organizations took the form of training in how to carry out civic actions and operate democratically. This activity has reached over 1,000 organizations nationwide.

USAID and a Malian government body, the North Commission, held interregional meetings in Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal with all active development organizations in attendance (Malian

government ministries, international and Malian NGOs, and donors). These meetings, which will continue to be held, are a forum to discuss development programs in the violence-prone northern region and improve cooperation and coordination among the major bodies actively implementing peace and development programs.

Mauritania

An estimated 10,000 landmines remain in Mauritania from the war in neighboring Western Sahara. In FY99, Mauritania received US humanitarian demining assistance for the first time. Initial funding supported two separate survey initiatives designed to facilitate the development of a country program. The United States intends to work with Mauritania to develop an indigenous demining capacity.

Niger

In April 1999, the US deeply regretted the *coup d'etat* in Niger and violent assassination of President Ibrahim Mainasara Bare. The US strongly condemned the resort to violence to resolve political conflicts and called on Niger's Council of National Reconciliation (CRN) to restore constitutional rule and move quickly to effect a peaceful transition to a democratically elected, civilian government. It urged all elements of Nigerien society to continue to work together to maintain calm and to strive for genuine peace and national reconciliation. On April 13, the CRN announced a specific timetable for the conduct of legislative and presidential elections and the inauguration of a civilian president. The US urged the Nigerien authorities to take concrete steps to fulfill their promises and exhorted all sectors of Nigerien society to work together to implement a credible transition to democratic rule.

USAID sought to strengthen regional peace and stability by mitigating local and cross-border effects of disease and drought. Since a peace accord signed in 1995 ended the Tuareg rebellion in the north; strengthening food security and reviving the local economy has been critical to sustaining peace in the region. In addition, there was a desperate need for increased job opportunities for the displaced Tuareg populations and ex-combatants. To address these needs, USAID has supported resettlement, basic health care for women and children, food security cereal banks and efforts to improve natural resource management. These activities have been designed to strengthen the region's stability by reviving economic activities in northern Tuareg communities, providing opportunities for displaced populations and former combatants, and mitigating food insecurity.

Nigeria

One element of the US approach to support the transformation of Nigeria into a working democracy was the effort to diffuse tension in the Niger Delta. The State Department co-sponsored a conference in Port Harcourt in February 1999 to encourage dialogue among Delta political leaders. USAID has now established an office in Port Harcourt to develop projects in the region, and the State Department is developing a Corporate Responsibility Initiative to link the oil companies, NGOs, Delta residents and the government.

Presidential Special Envoy Reverend Jesse Jackson traveled to Nigeria in March 1999, following the Nigerian presidential election in late February. He met with Nigerian Head of State Abubakar in Abuja, as well as President-elect Olusegun Obasanjo and opposition leader Olu Falae in Lagos. He also met with local government and civil society representatives in the Niger Delta region. He

stressed the importance of reconciliation, national unity and completion of the transition to democratic civilian rule.

A USAID-sponsored workshop in Warri Delta State brought together elders and warring youths for a training course designed to nurture peace and harmony and reduce violent clashes. A two-day training workshop was also held to educate newly elected National and State Assembly members in the northeast of Nigeria in several areas, including peaceful conflict resolution, good government and anti-corruption practices.

Senegal

The State Department provided logistical support to the “Days of Reflection” in late June 1999. This was the first meeting of the Casamance rebel factions (the MFDC) as they prepared for formal negotiations with the government of Senegal.

Under the aegis of the Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), the US has been supporting regional peacekeeping through training and provision of equipment dedicated to keeping the peace. The Senegalese military applied their training in difficult situations in both the Central African Republic and in Guinea-Bissau during 1999.

A USAID program to improve natural resource management included strengthening the capacity of local organizations in the areas of problem-solving, opening dialogue among different stakeholders, and mediation. Given the potential for competition over scarce resources to erupt into conflict, these efforts helped diffuse tension and prevent violence. The capacity building programs have also helped to devolve practical decisions closer to the grassroots level and therefore closer to the root causes of conflict.

Sierra Leone

As FY99 began in October 1998, the civil war in Sierra Leone was the major conflict resolution challenge facing the West African Affairs office of the State Department’s Africa Bureau. To prevent a rebel overthrow of the elected civilian government of Sierra Leone, the Bureau’s peacekeeping funds were used to provide non-lethal logistical support to the regional peacekeeping force (ECOMOG) that was attempting to maintain order there.

When it became clear that there would be no military resolution to the war, the State Department worked with the government of Sierra Leone and the representatives of the rebel alliance to begin a dialogue. That dialogue led to the opening of peace talks between the rebel alliance and the government in May 1999. Presidential Special Envoy Reverend Jesse Jackson went to Lomé, Togo, to help broker a cease-fire agreement at the beginning of the talks.

Once the cease-fire was established, US Ambassador to Sierra Leone Joseph Melrose was sent to Lomé where he worked closely with the parties throughout the six weeks of negotiations that led to the accord signed on July 7. Once an agreement was achieved, the challenge was to implement it. Again, Ambassador Melrose worked closely with the regional powers, the UK and the UN, the government of Sierra Leone and the leaders of the rebel alliance to keep the process moving forward.

The US government commended the peacekeeping efforts of the ECOMOG forces and the enormous human and material sacrifices they made in defending the people and the legitimately elected government of Sierra Leone.

The US condemned in the strongest terms the brutal Revolutionary United Front (RUF) insurgency in Sierra Leone. In their effort to gain power, the insurgents mutilated, raped and killed thousands of innocent civilians. The US stood firmly with the democratically elected government of President Ahmad Kabbah. It was especially concerned about external regional support for the RUF insurgency and continued to urge the government of Liberia to take all necessary measures to stop support for RUF activities emanating from its territory.

Presidential Special Envoy to Liberia Ambassador Howard F. Jeter participated in a preparatory discussion in July 1999 with Presidents of the Mano River Union (Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone) to plan for a Mano River Union Summit on sustaining regional support for the implementation of the Sierra Leone Peace Accord.

USAID engaged in numerous endeavors designed to foster reconciliation and the peace process in this troubled country. These included:

- Supporting consultations on the peace process
- Production and dissemination of radio programs, songs, theatrical performances and music festivals to promote peace and reconciliation
- Sponsoring numerous workshops and training sessions throughout the country on such topics as the peace process, reconciliation, trauma healing, cooperation, skill training for ex-combatants, peace education, negative effects of tribalism, and the Lomé Peace Accord
- Mediation to resolve a conflict between the traditional leadership, school administration and civil populace of the Njala Komboya chiefdom
- Supporting civil society delegates at the peace talks in Lomé.

USAID has also supported monitoring and assessment of the peace process in Sierra Leone. The state of election preparations and political party process was evaluated in keeping with the Lomé agreement. At the closing of FY99, steps had been taken to appoint an independent Sierra Leonean electoral commission. In addition, USAID supported activities aimed at facilitating progress toward effective civilian control over the national military.

Togo

The US considered that, absent the participation of opposition candidates, the March 1999 legislative election in Togo did not reflect the will of the Togolese people and further delayed a political resolution of Togo's difficult political and economic problems. The US regretted that national reconciliation talks were not fully undertaken before the election. The US expressed hope that leaders of Togo's government and opposition, motivated by a spirit of compromise, would redouble their efforts to peacefully resolve their differences, which have severely hampered Togo's development in recent years.



Appendix A

Remarks by President William J. Clinton
**Conference on US-Africa Partnership
For the 21st Century**
Washington, DC
March 16, 1999

Thank you. Good morning. Let me say, first of all, to Minister Ouedraogo, thank you for your fine address and for your leadership. Secretary General Salim, Secretary General Annan, Secretary Albright; to our distinguished ministers and ambassadors and other officials from 46 African nations; and the representatives of the Cabinet and the United States Government. I am delighted to see you all here today. We are honored by your presence in the United States and excited about what it means for our common future.

A year ago next week I set out on my journey to Africa. It was, for me, for my wife and for many people who took that trip, an utterly unforgettable and profoundly moving experience. I went to Africa in the hope not only that I would learn, but that the process of the trip itself and the publicity that our friends in the press would give it would cause Americans and Africans to see each other in a new light - not denying the lingering effects of slavery, colonialism, Cold War, but to focus on a new future - to build a new chapter of history, a new era of genuine partnership.

A year later, we have to say there has been a fair measure of hope and some new disappointments. War still tears at the heart of Africa. Congo, Sierra Leone, Angola, Sudan have not yet resolved their conflicts. Ethiopia and Eritrea are mired in a truly tragic dispute we have done our best to try to help avoid. Violence still steals innocent lives in the Great Lakes region. In the last year, Nairobi and Dar es Salaam became battlefields in a terrorist campaign that killed and wounded thousands of Africans, along with Americans working there for a different future.

But there have also been promising new developments. The recent elections in Nigeria give Africa's most populous country, finally, a chance to realize its enormous potential. The transition may not be complete, but let's not forget, just a year ago it was unthinkable. This June, for the first time, South Africa will transfer power from one fully democratic government to another.

More than half the sub-Saharan nations are now governed by elected leaders. Many, such as Benin, Mali and Tanzania, have fully embraced open government and open markets. Quite a few have recorded strong economic growth, including Mozambique, crippled by civil war not long ago. Ghana's economy has grown by 5 percent a year since 1992.

All of you here have contributed to this progress. All are eager to make the next century better than the last. You share a great responsibility, for you are the architects of Africa's future.

Today, I would like to talk about the tangible ways we can move forward with our partnership. Since our trip to Africa my administration has worked hard to do more. We've created a \$120 million educational initiative to link schools in Africa to schools in this country. We've created the Great Lakes Justice Initiative to attack the culture of impunity. We have launched a Safe

Skies Initiative to increase air links between Africa and the rest of the world; given \$30 million to protect food security in Africa and more to be provided during this year.

In my budget submission to Congress I have asked for additional funds to cover the cost of relieving another \$237 million in African debt on top of the \$245 million covered in this year's appropriation.

We're working hard with you to bring an end to the armed conflicts which claim innocent lives and block economic progress; conducting extensive shuttle diplomacy in an effort to resolve the dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In Sierra Leone we're doing what we can to reduce suffering and forge a lasting peace. We have provided \$75 million in humanitarian assistance over the last 18 months. And with the approval of Congress we will triple our long-standing commitment of support for ECOMOG [Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group] to conduct regional peacekeeping.

We have also done what we can to build the African Crisis Response Initiative, with members of our military cooperating with African militaries. We've provided \$8 million since 1993 to the OAU's Conflict Management Center to support African efforts to resolve disputes and end small conflicts before they explode into large ones.

Nonetheless, we have a lot of ground to make up. For too much of this century, the relationship between the United States and Africa was plagued by indifference on our part. This conference represents an unparalleled opportunity to raise our growing cooperation to the next level. During the next few days we want to talk about how these programs work and hear from you about how we can do better. Eight members of my Cabinet will meet their African counterparts. The message I want your leaders to take home is this is a partnership with substance, backed by a long-term commitment.

This is truly a relationship for the long haul. We have been too separate and too unequal. We must end that by building a better common future. We need to strive together to do better, with a clear vision of what we want to achieve over the long run. Ten years from now, we want to see more growth rates above 5 percent. A generation from now, we want to see a larger middle class, more jobs and consumers, more African exports, thriving schools filled with children —boys and girls— with high expectations and a reasonable chance of fulfilling them.

But we need the tools to get there —the tools of aid, trade and investment. As I said when I was in Africa, this must not be a choice between aid and trade; we must have both. In my budget request for the next fiscal year, I've asked for an increase of 10 percent in development assistance to Africa. But the aid is about quality and quantity. Our aid programs are developed with your involvement, designed to develop the institutions needed to sustain democracy and to reduce poverty and to increase independence.

To expand opportunity, we also need trade. Our administration strongly supports the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which I said in my State of the Union address we will work to pass in this session of Congress. The act represents the first step in creating, for the first time in our history, a genuine framework for US-Africa trade relations. It provides immediate benefits to nations modernizing their economies, and offers incentives to others to do the same. It increases US assistance, targeting it where it will do the most good.

The bill clearly will benefit both Africa and the United States. Africans ask for more access to our markets; this bill provides that. You asked that GSP [Generalized System of Preferences] benefits be extended; this bill extends them for 10 years. You said you need more private investment; this

bill calls for the creation of two equity investment funds by OPIC, providing up to \$650 million to generate private investment in Africa.

We agree that labor concerns are important. This bill removes GSP benefits for any country found to be denying worker rights. You told us we need to understand more about your views on development. This bill provides a forum for high-level dialogue and cooperation.

It is a principled and pragmatic approach based on what will work. No one is saying it will be easy, but we are resolved to help lower the hurdles left by past mistakes. I believe it represents a strong, achievable and important step forward. There are many friends of Africa in Congress and many strong opinions about how best to help Africa. I hope they will quickly find consensus. We cannot afford a house divided. Africa needs action now.

There's another crucial way the United States can hasten Africa's integration. One of the most serious issues we must deal with together, and one of truly global importance, is debt relief. Today, I ask the international community to take actions which could result in forgiving \$70 billion [\$70,000 million] in global debt relief—global debt. Our goal is to ensure that no country committed to fundamental reform is left with a debt burden that keeps it from meeting its people's basic human needs and spurring growth. We should provide extraordinary relief for countries making extraordinary efforts to build working economies.

To achieve this goal, in consultation with our Congress and within the framework of our balanced budget, I proposed that we make significant improvements to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative at the Cologne Summit of the G-7 in June. First, a new focus on early relief by international financial institutions, which now reduce debt only at the end of the HIPC program. Combined with ongoing forgiveness of cash flows by the Paris Club, this will substantially accelerate relief from debt payment burden.

Second, the complete forgiveness of all bilateral concessional loans to the poorest countries. Third, deeper and broader reduction of other bilateral debts, raising the amount to 90 percent. Fourth, to avoid recurring debt problems, donor countries should commit to provide at least 90 percent of new development assistance on a grant basis to countries eligible for debt reduction.

Fifth, new approaches to help countries emerging from conflicts that have not had the chance to establish reform records, and need immediate relief and concessional finance. And, sixth, support for gold sales by the IMF to do its part, and additional contributions by us and other countries to the World Bank's trust fund to help meet the cost of this initiative. Finally, we should be prepared to provide even greater relief in exceptional cases where it could make a real difference.

What I am proposing is debt reduction that is deeper and faster. It is demanding, but to put it simply, the more debtor nations take responsibility for pursuing sound economic policies, the more creditor nations must be willing to provide debt relief.

One of the best days of my trip last year was the day I opened an investment center in Johannesburg, named after our late Commerce Secretary, Ron Brown, a true visionary who knew that peace, democracy and prosperity would grow in Africa with the right kind of support. I can't think of a better tribute to him than our work here today, for he understood that Africa's transformation will not happen overnight, but, on the other hand, that it should happen and that it could happen.

Look at Latin America's progress over the last decade. Look at Asia before that. In each case, the same formula worked: Peace, open markets, democracy and hard work lifted hundreds of millions

of people from poverty. It has nothing to do with latitude and longitude, or religion or race. It has everything to do with an equal chance and smart decisions.

There are a thousand reasons Africa and the United States should work together for the 21st century, reasons buried deep in our past, reasons apparent in the future just ahead. It is the right thing to do, and it is in the self-interest of all the peoples represented in this room today. Africa obviously matters to the 30 million Americans who trace their roots there. But Africa matters to all Americans. It provides 13 percent of our oil, nearly as much as the Middle East. Over 100,000 American jobs depend upon our exports to Africa. There could be millions more when Africa realizes its potential. As Africa grows it will need what we produce and we will need what Africa produces.

Africa is home to 700 million people, nearly a fifth of the world. Last year, our growing relationship with this enormous market helped to protect the United States from the global financial crisis raging elsewhere. While exports were down in other parts of the world, exports from the United States to Africa actually went up by 8 percent, topping \$6 billion [\$6,000 million]. As wise investors have discovered, investments in Africa pay. In 1997, the rate of return of American investments in Africa was 36 percent —compared with 16 percent in Asia, 14 percent worldwide, 11 percent in Europe.

As has already been said, we share common health and environmental concerns with people all over the world, and certainly in Africa. If we want to deal with the problems of global warming and climate change, we must deal in partnership with Africa. If we want to deal with a whole array of public health problems that affect not only the children and people of Africa, but people throughout the rest of the world, we must do it in partnership with Africa.

Finally, I'd like to just state a simple truth that guides our relations with all nations. Countries that are democratic, peaceful and prosperous are good neighbors and good partners. They help respond to crises. They respect the environment. They abide by international law. They protect their working people and their consumers. They honor women as well as men. They give all their children a chance.

There are 46 nations represented here today - roughly a quarter of all the countries on Earth. You share a dazzling variety of people and languages and traditions. The world of the 21st century needs your strength, your contribution, your full participation in the struggle to unleash the human potential of people everywhere.

Africa is the ancient cradle of humanity. But it is also a remarkably young continent, full of young people with an enormous stake in the future. When I traveled through the streets of the African cities and I saw the tens of thousands, the hundreds of thousands of young people who came out to see me, I wanted them to have long, full, healthy lives. I tried to imagine what their lives could be like if we could preserve the peace, preserve freedom, extend genuine opportunity, give them a chance to have a life that was both full of liberty and ordered, structured chances—chances that their parents and grandparents did not know.

The Kanuri people of Nigeria, Niger and Chad say, "Hope is the pillar of the world." The last decade proves that hope is stronger than despair, if it is followed by action. Action is the mandate of this conference.

Let us move beyond words and do what needs to be done. For our part, that means debt relief, passage of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, appropriate increases in assistance, and a genuine sense of partnership and openness to future possibilities. For your part, it means

continuing the work of building the institutions that bring democracy and peace, prosperity and equal opportunity.

We are ending a decade, the 1990s, that began with a powerful symbol. I will never forget the early Sunday morning in 1990, when I got my daughter up and took her down to the kitchen to turn on the television so that she could watch Nelson Mandela walk out of his prison for the last time. She was just a young girl, and I told her that I had the feeling that this would be one of the most important events of her lifetime, in terms of its impact on the imagination of freedom-loving people everywhere.

We could not have known then, either she or I or my wife, that we would have the great good fortune to get to know Mr. Mandela and see his generosity extended to our family, and to our child, as it has been to children all over his country. But in that walk, we saw a continent's expression of dignity, of self-respect, of the soaring potential of the unfettered human spirit.

For a decade now, the people of South Africa and the people of Africa have been trying to make the symbol of that walk real in the lives of all the people of the continent. We still have a long way to go. But let us not forget how far we have come. And let us not forget that greatness resides not only in the people who lead countries and who overcome persecutions, but in the heart and mind of every child, and every person —there is the potential to do better, to reach higher, to fulfill dreams. It is our job to give all the children of Africa the chance to do that.

Thank you very much.



Appendix B

Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright
**Speech before the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) and
The Nigerian Community**
Abuja, Nigeria, October 20, 1999

(Introductory remarks deleted)

Although I am new here, I do not feel like a stranger. For I have watched Nigeria's progress over the past year with the same mix of solemnity and joy that I felt a decade ago to see tyranny overthrown and nations reborn across Central Europe. I had never given up the belief that I would one day hear freedom ring again in the streets of Prague, my native city. And I had never stopped hoping that I would be able, during my time as Secretary of State, to visit a Nigeria whole and free.

Today, it is possible to envision Nigeria becoming, at long last, what Wole Soyinka has called "an unstoppable nation, rich in human and material resources, a nation endowed with a seeming gift of leadership, one whose citizens anywhere in the world would be revered. . . simply by the very possession of a Nigerian passport."

And when the history of this decade is written, Nigeria's transformation has every chance of standing beside the Czechoslovak Velvet Revolution, and South Africa's long walk to freedom, as a shining example of the strength of human dignity —and the depth of the desire for freedom.

Two days ago, I saw that same dignity and desire written across the faces of the people of Sierra Leone. I saw people who had suffered unspeakable horror, yet who sought not revenge but renewal.

I met African children eagerly learning to use prosthetics from an American veteran, himself a double amputee. I watched the most bitter enemies slowly learning to talk to each other. And I had the pleasure of reviewing ECOMOG troops, Nigerians and other West Africans, who are providing the stability Sierra Leone needs to begin again.

There is no message of easy optimism in the camps of Sierra Leone, or on the long path Nigeria has still to travel. But there is an opportunity to build a true partnership between the United States and Africa —to leave behind the attitudes and habits of the past, and seize opportunities to work together to achieve shared goals.

I am proud of what we have achieved thus far. President Clinton and his Cabinet, myself included, have made an unprecedented investment of time and energy to develop our ties with Africa across a broad new range of subjects, from agriculture and transportation policy to promoting trade and fighting corruption.

Our nations are working together to end conflicts and build peace. Combat the crime and terror that know no borders. Promote economic reform and integration. And support democratic institutions and accountable government.

It matters profoundly whether we succeed —and it matters nowhere more than here in Nigeria.

Nigeria is important to the United States and the world because you have the potential to be an economic powerhouse for Africa and global markets. Because you are already a leader for peace. And because, ever since your struggle for independence, you have been a signpost for others in search of freedom.

President Obasanjo has already done much to restore Nigeria's democratic institutions. The steps still to come include the repeal of the last repressive laws; the return of Nigeria's judiciary to its former renown; and the consolidation of civilian control of the military. These are the long-term changes which will ensure that this time, democracy has come to Nigeria to stay.

Nigerians are also showing great determination to come to terms with the abuses of the past. I applaud recent progress toward bringing to justice the killers of Kudirat Abiola, Shehu Yar'Adua and others. And I welcome President Obasanjo's courage and far-sightedness in appointing a panel to investigate human rights abuses committed since 1984, as well as establishing a committee to review dubious government contracts signed since by previous regimes.

These investigations, if they are fully and honestly carried out, are an opportunity to break —for good— the cycle of impunity that has claimed so many lives and done so much to discredit legitimate authority.

We also want to do all that we can to help establish justice and permanent peace among Nigerians of every ethnicity and creed. Later today, I will visit Kano, to gain a better understanding of that part of Nigeria's rich mosaic.

And I follow with concern the extraordinary challenges that Nigeria faces in the Niger Delta region.

Communal tensions there have been fed by past government neglect, police and military brutality, and extreme poverty and despair —even as tremendous oil wealth is pumped from the Delta every day.

I want to commend President Obasanjo for his efforts to defuse the crisis and to hear the concerns of the Delta peoples. I stress America's desire to do what we can to help find solutions that are based on the rule of law, not the law of force. Solutions that give the Delta peoples a voice in their own future —and a stake in the future of Nigeria. And I believe we can help find ways to work with American oil companies on these issues. They too have a stake in seeing Nigeria's transformation succeed.

And they can be partners in developing the Delta and bettering the lives of its people.

Nigeria's success in meeting the challenges of democracy will be a welcome inspiration across Africa. For our part, the United States will continue to be a strong supporter of democratic forces across the continent. We work with governments seeking to make the transition. And we support the elements of civil society, such as the journalists, labor unions, women's groups and other

activists that have kept Nigeria's democratic vocation alive.

President Clinton has pledged to work to return American assistance to Africa to its past high levels. We will be making the case to the American people that Africa's peace and well-being are closely bound with our national interests, whether fighting crime and terrorism or promoting exports and trade. We will be explaining that our assistance programs for Africa are an investment in our common future.

And we will be working with Congress to achieve a substantial addition to our funding, including a three- or four-fold increase in our assistance to Nigeria.

As President Clinton stressed at the UN General Assembly last month, the fight *against* poverty and underdevelopment is a critical part of our struggle *for* democracy and stability in Africa.

We cannot hope to combat poverty without winning the war on HIV/AIDS. The imperative in Africa now, as in my own country a decade ago, is to face squarely the reality of this disease. It has killed more people than all the wars of this century combined. And it will leave 40 million children homeless and orphaned by the end of the next decade.

The way to beat AIDS is not to ignore or deny it, but to prevent it. Countries such as Uganda and Senegal that have faced the threat squarely are beginning to see reductions in their infection rates. We know it can be done. We are ready to help. And we are working with Congress to put in place a \$100 million program for 14 African countries and India.

Spending on health, education and social welfare is not just important to democratic stability. It is fundamental to economic growth, along with economic reform and improved investment climates.

The United States will continue to support Africa's modernizing economies and encourage American investors to take a closer look at the opportunities Africa has to offer.

For almost two years, we have sought to obtain passage of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act—one of the most important pieces of legislation on Africa that I can remember. Its purpose is to build trade and investment links between the United States and Africa that will benefit us both. The Senate vote on this legislation may come as soon as this week.

This is a job-creating, trade-expanding, growth-producing measure for both sides of the Atlantic. It deserves the strong support of Congress and the American people. It is time to treat Africa just as we do our other trading partners, and this bill will accomplish that.

In this and other ways, the United States will keep working to provide new incentives for investment and trade with Africa. We will continue to encourage spending for microenterprise and economic opportunities for women.

We will continue to seek out and initiate continent-wide projects such as our Safe Skies Initiative, which is making African commerce easier by making air travel safer and more secure.

And we will continue to be a leader in reducing the crushing burden of international debt which African nations face. The international financial institutions and the G-7 have approved President Clinton's plan to make it easier for countries to qualify for debt relief, to provide relief more rapidly and to ensure that savings are used to meet social needs.

Ultimately, private sector investment will be the engine of long-term growth across Africa. And if domestic investment is to be profitable and foreign investment attractive, the battle against crime and corruption must be won.

Too many of Africa's resources are being squandered and its peace shattered, by the criminal and corrupt - by diamond runners, drug peddlers and those who consider public office a license to steal.

Those complicit come in all colors and nationalities. They include leaders and generals who sell off their countries' resources to pad their bank accounts and use child soldiers to fight their senseless wars. They include international and local criminal organizations that use Africa as a convenient base of operations. They include mercenaries who would sell drugs and guns to a kindergarten if the mark-up were high enough.

This is a fight between those with faith in the rule of law and those who believe in no rules at all. Its ill effects touch every nation. And we must combat it together.

That is why the United States supports the West African Small Arms Moratorium, which bans shipments to 16 countries for three years. We hope this West African innovation will spread to other regions, as part of a global offensive against illicit arms transfers.

That is why we have tightened our own regulations governing arms sales, making it illegal for traffickers subject to American law to broker illicit deals anywhere.

And that is why it is time to choke off the underground economy that fuels conflict with illicit sales of gemstones, precious metals and narcotics.

As we work to fight transnational threats, we must find ways to end the conflicts that block African development and threaten regional peace.

I have said repeatedly that our involvement in peacemaking in Kosovo, East Timor and elsewhere around the world is not an excuse for inaction in Africa —it is a challenge to do better. One of the areas where the international community must improve is in developing the resources of our African partners —so that we can move together, quickly and effectively, to prevent and respond to crises.

That is why the United States is the largest contributor to the OAU's Conflict Management Center. That is why President Clinton's Africa Crisis Response Initiative has already trained and equipped battalion-sized contingents from six countries for peacekeeping.

Yesterday, I reviewed a battalion of Malian troops on its way to Sierra Leone. They are trained by Americans, supported by the Dutch, and will serve with soldiers from Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana and elsewhere. Such partnerships are an important step —and ECOWAS is a vital partner — toward ensuring that the nightmares of Sierra Leone, and Rwanda before it, will not be repeated.

For much of this decade, ECOWAS has been on the front line of the struggle for peace in Africa. Too often, in fact, you have been the only line separating innocent civilians from utter chaos. Much has been asked of you in Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Liberia. You have stretched limited resources farther than the international community had any right to expect; and you have

achieved more than anyone dared hope.

The United States has been ECOMOG's largest supporter, providing well over \$100 million this decade. We have allocated an additional \$11 million in logistical support for your mission in Sierra Leone. This week, we will vote in the UN Security Council to send a peacekeeping mission to Sierra Leone, to help relieve the burden you have carried so long.

We are also ready to help strengthen ECOWAS itself, both in its security architecture and in its efforts to promote regional economic integration and trade.

Elsewhere on the continent, the United States has taken a lead role in re-energizing a regional peace process in Sudan. We are working with the Organization for African Unity to help end the conflict between our friends Ethiopia and Eritrea. We are working to defuse the escalating tensions in Burundi. And we will help implement the peace agreement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Each of these conflicts is a serious roadblock in the way of Africa's development. But they are not the sum of Africa's present —or its future.

Since becoming a diplomat, I have come to Africa half a dozen times and have seen both the continent's problems and its promise. From Addis to Luanda, and from Gulu to Cape Town, some of what I have witnessed has saddened me. But I have also been inspired.

Nowhere in the world are there stronger or braver people than those working now to secure justice, prosperity and lasting peace across Africa.

In recent days, I have been reminded of the immense debt that the world owes to President Nyerere and millions of Africans like him, who in our lifetime have shown us how to be champions of peace and forces of liberty.

Mwalimu was unique, capable of soaring vision and deep humility. He believed, profoundly, in what Africa could be. And he lived his beliefs as best he knew how.

Sixteen years ago, the writer Chinua Achebe wrote that "One shining act of bold, selfless leadership from the top, such as unambiguous refusal to be corrupt or to tolerate corruption at the fountain of authority, will radiate powerful sensations of well-being and pride through every nerve and artery of national life."

I expect that I will see that pride on the faces of thousands of Tanzanians tomorrow, as I join them in paying Mwalimu homage. I see that pride here today, in the faces of Nigerians who struggled for so long, performing countless acts of bravery while refusing to see their democratic will denied.

I believe that Nigeria's new hope and pride will radiate beyond your borders, just as the courage of Nyerere, Mandela, and their million less-known colleagues illuminated not just a continent but the world. I believe they will spark more acts of leadership toward a better, freer tomorrow.

When I think about the future in Africa, I am reminded of another great force for freedom, Vaclav Havel. He has said that "I am not an optimist, because I am not sure that everything ends well. Nor am I a pessimist, because I am not sure that everything ends badly. Instead I am a realist who carries hope. And hope is the belief that freedom and justice have meaning. . . and

that liberty is always worth the trouble."

I am a realist ? or, as a Malian newspaper called me yesterday, an Afro-realist. In Africa, as across the time zones and from pole to pole, liberty is always worth the trouble. And I hope you will join me in striving to give freedom and justice one true meaning for us all.

Thank you very much.



Appendix C

Susan E. Rice, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs

**United States Interests in Africa:
Post-Cold War, Post-Apartheid**

Rhodes Scholars Southern Africa Forum,
1999 Bram Fischer Memorial Lecture
Rhodes House, Oxford, England, May 13, 1999

(Introductory remarks deleted)

In June (1999), South Africa will hand over power from one democratically elected government to another? an accomplishment none of the founding members of the Rhodes Scholars Against Apartheid would have predicted a decade ago. At the same time, Nigeria is implementing a bold transition to civilian rule.

Economies that were registering negative growth rates in the 1980s are now growing at rates of approximately 4%, and some, such as once war-torn Mozambique, recorded double-digit growth rates last year. A new generation of leaders ? governmental, nongovernmental and entrepreneurial? is emerging that is committed to market reforms and inclusive political systems. Democratic institutions ? however fragile or flawed? now form the basis for government in the majority of African nations. A total of 14 African countries have publicly committed to fight graft and work toward a binding anti-corruption convention. And many African people are now demanding a full voice in charting their own destinies.

The United States has significant economic and security stakes in this new Africa, an Africa we no longer view as a superpower battleground or through the distorted prism of apartheid.

Our first interest in Africa, as elsewhere, is defending our own national security and protecting Americans in the United States and abroad. Everywhere, the United States faces a new set of enemies? transnational security threats that put at great risk your citizens, our citizens and people across the world. As President Clinton has said, "the same forces of technology that offer new economic and social opportunities also create new dangers." And no place and no one is immune, including the continent and the people of Africa.

If some Americans were doubtful about our significant security interests in Africa, if their eyes were focused elsewhere ? toward the Persian Gulf, the Korean Peninsula, or the Balkans? they were sadly refocused last August 7 when bombs destroyed our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The blasts, which killed over 200 Africans and Americans, made 1998 the most deadly year for international terrorism on record.

The number of terrorist incidents worldwide is also up ? as the most dangerous elements of the world community become more sinister and elusive, their weapons and methods more powerful and sophisticated. Of the seven countries on the United States' list of state sponsors of

international terror, two ? Libya and Sudan? are in Africa. Usama bin Laden's network is extensive throughout the continent, while Somalia has become a safe haven for terrorists and a major transit point for illicit weapons.

Yet, terrorism and extremism are not the only threats we face on the African continent. Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons proliferation, though not as prevalent as in other regions, is a serious concern in Africa. Libya aims to acquire nuclear weapons. It also continues to develop deadly chemical and biological weapons and long-range missiles. Sudan continues to seek a chemical weapons capability. And apartheid-era experts on weapons of mass destruction still roam free and are able to sell their knowledge to pariah states worldwide.

Africa is also perhaps the hottest world market for conventional arms merchants unloading Cold War refuse. Most of these weapons are flowing into Africa's war zones, further fueling destabilizing conflicts.

In addition, narcotics manufactured in or transiting through Africa constitute a significant share of the supply on American and European streets. Indeed, Nigerian organized crime groups, with hundreds of cells worldwide, are active traffickers in high-purity heroin from Asia to major metropolitan areas in the central and eastern United States. Approximately 30% of the heroin intercepted at US ports of entry in recent years was seized from African-controlled couriers. South Africa is also emerging as a significant transshipment point, as are Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire.

Furthermore, Americans lose over \$2 billion annually to white-collar crime syndicates based in Nigeria, mostly from financial schemes including insurance, credit card and advance-fee scams. In addition, Nigeria ranks fifth worldwide as a source of counterfeit US currency.

Environmental degradation is also a global threat that affects all of us and our children. Damage done to Africa's delicate ecosystem, including deforestation, contributes to global warming ? aggravating food productivity, intensifying droughts, floods and El Nino effects worldwide, while hastening the spread of infectious diseases.

In Africa, as you know, we also face some of the world's most deadly and communicable diseases ? Ebola, malaria and HIV/AIDS. As people move more easily across borders and oceans, so too do the infections they may carry. Preventing, containing and controlling the transmission of these deadly diseases is an important security imperative for the US in Africa and elsewhere.

All these transnational threats ? from arms flows to drug flows - are most difficult to combat where national institutions are weakest, where people are poorest and conflicts most enduring. We need strong, democratic, economically viable partners in Africa. Only such partners can be relied upon to invest in healthcare to stem disease, to foster environmentally sustainable development, to apprehend terrorists and drug traffickers, and to deny extremist elements both material support and a gullible following. In contrast, where democracy fails, poverty prevails and strife is the norm, we risk seeing whole countries, even regions, grow more vulnerable to our most dangerous adversaries.

Africa cannot be an afterthought. We cannot afford to postpone our efforts to build a strong US-Africa partnership. This partnership is a necessity and must be a priority, if we are to secure our own future in the 21st century.

We have other important strategic interests in Africa as well. Africa is the source of over 13% of our nation's imported oil, compared to 17% from the Middle East. Within the next decade, oil imports from Africa are projected to surpass those from the Persian Gulf region. The US relies on Africa as a source of strategic minerals, including platinum, cobalt, bauxite and manganese.

Moreover, the Cape controls shipping between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. The Horn is a potential choke point for traffic between the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean. Our base access agreement with Kenya is key to our ability to project force, when necessary, in the Persian Gulf. Add these facts to our increasing stake in Africa's emerging market ? and Africa's importance to the economic well being of the US becomes self-evident.

America's reliance on Africa's markets is, in fact, growing by leaps and bounds. Almost 2 years ago, the global financial crisis caused a major downturn in US exports and unease in our export-driven economy. Yet while US exports to the troubled economies of Asia and elsewhere were down by almost a third last year, US exports to Africa increased 8%. Last year, we exported 45% more to Sub-Saharan Africa than to all the states of the former Soviet Union combined.

Major US companies are making large investments in Africa ? from Enron's \$2.5 billion contract to build a steel plant in Mozambique, to Southwestern Bell Corporation's \$700 million stake in South Africa/Telkom. Boeing provides 60% of Africa's airline fleet. Caterpillar now has dealerships in 15 African countries. Fully 100,000 US jobs are tied to our exports to Africa.

Still, the United States' share of the African market is small ? only 7%, making it the largest untapped market for the US in the world. Africa's potential for tomorrow's creative entrepreneurs is explosive, especially in the natural resource sector, consumer products, agribusiness, infrastructure and telecommunications. Just think: there are more telephones in the Borough of Manhattan, or in central London, than in all of Africa.

Nearly 50% of Africans are under the age of 15. These are young people who can develop fierce brand loyalties for everything from soft drinks to blue jeans. Africa, a market of approximately 700 million potential consumers, truly represents the last frontier for US exporters and investors.

Finally, we have a significant humanitarian stake in Africa and strong cultural and historical ties to the African people. Some 12% of Americans, almost 33 million people, trace their roots to the African continent. Many Americans, not just African-Americans, feel a strong obligation to better the lives of people throughout Africa. They care not only about helping to prevent and resolve conflicts but also about responding effectively alongside the international community to crises and humanitarian disasters. Last year, the United States provided almost \$700 million in assistance to the victims of war, famine and disease in Africa ? from Sierra Leone to Sudan to Angola.

In the wake of the Cold War, President Clinton was among the first to stress that Africa's successes and failures matter directly to the United States and its citizens. Thus, he changed fundamentally the way the US approaches Africa. We have moved beyond a patron-client relationship to a partnership based on mutual interest and mutual respect. We seek to work with our African partners to ensure our collective security and prosperity in the century to come.

Some 5 years ago, at the first-ever White House Conference on Africa, President Clinton said, "In the post-Cold War and post-apartheid world...[w]e have a new freedom and a new responsibility to see Africa ? to see it whole, to see it in specific nations and specific problems and specific promise." He went on to insist: "[We must] develop a policy [toward Africa that will]...unleash

the human potential of the people of the African continent in ways that [will] lead to a safer and more prosperous world, a better life for them and a better life for us."

Since 1994, we have crafted and are now implementing a visionary economic policy toward Africa that seeks to spur economic reform and growth —both for the benefit of the United States and Africa. Under President Clinton's Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity, we have taken important steps to encourage greater two-way trade and private sector investment through more than \$750 million in investment financing and insurance.

We are also relieving hundreds of millions of dollars of Africa's debt ? debt that threatens to retard progress in Africa's fastest reforming economies. In March, President Clinton announced a proposal, which he will press at the G-8 summit in Cologne in June, to relieve an additional \$70 billion of global debt. African nations will be the primary beneficiaries. Debt relief, along with pending domestic legislation such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act, will directly support African nations making difficult strides to open their markets, invest in their people and practice good governance.

The United States is also actively working to strengthen democracy and promote human rights in Africa. We provided substantial assistance to support South Africa's first democratic election in 1994. We helped finance Nigeria's recent elections and, more importantly, will invest for years to come in establishing credible, grass-roots structures and genuinely democratic institutions in this vitally important country. At the same time, we are implementing a Great Lakes Justice program to bolster civil and military judicial institutions in volatile Central Africa. The President's \$120 million Education for Development and Democracy Initiative also aims to help improve access to technology, support girls' education, and boost civil society across the African continent.

At the same time, the United States continues to play an active role ? diplomatically and operationally? to help prevent and resolve African conflicts. And today, sadly, they are many. Ethiopia and Eritrea, both friends of the United States, resumed fighting in February after a 9-month hiatus. This conflict is now unleashing numerous dangerous forces throughout the Horn of Africa, including intensified clan warfare in Somalia.

In Sierra Leone, rebel forces continue to ravage whole cities, tilting the fragile balance in West Africa. In Sudan, the 16-year civil war has claimed an estimated 2 million lives. Angola has resumed a civil war that was once the most deadly on earth.

And at least eight countries are embroiled in a bitter war in the Congo. Congo is resource rich, possessing substantial shares of the world's supply of hydro-electrical power, uranium, cobalt, gold, diamonds and copper. It also is an oil-producing nation. A fragmented, economically feeble Congo is an enormous security risk. It and other conflict zones threaten to become fertile ground for pariah states as well as hideaways and launching pads for international terrorists, arms smugglers and drug dealers.

In recent years, US leadership and resources have been instrumental in helping bring an end to protracted conflicts in Mozambique and Liberia, and to easing tensions in Burundi.

Today, we continue to work tirelessly with our European and African partners to end disputes from the Horn of Africa to the Congo.

For example, through hands-on support for regional negotiations and active cooperation with Her Majesty's Government, the United States is pressing the rebels, the government and regional

leaders to reach a swift cease-fire and comprehensive peace settlement in Sierra Leone. Along with Britain, we are also providing additional logistical support to the West African peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, to help restore order to Sierra Leone's countryside.

We also have significantly stepped up our efforts with other donors to invigorate the Sudan peace process under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). A new secretariat, with technical committees for the key issues under negotiation, will be established in Nairobi to ensure a sustained and continuous mediation effort. We are maintaining our direct pressure on the Khartoum regime to halt its support for terrorism, its heinous human rights abuses and efforts to destabilize friendly neighboring states.

The United States has also begun the process of working with our African partners to combat transnational security threats. We are now providing counterterrorism training in eight African nations. We are exploring with our southern African partners the establishment of an international law enforcement academy and launching a safe-skies initiative to make African airports and skies safer and more secure. With other donor nations, including Great Britain, the United States is supporting a west African small-arms moratorium, which imposed a renewable 3-year ban on the manufacture, import and export of small arms within the region.

In order to confront all these challenges, the US has sought to improve dramatically the content and caliber of our dialogue with our African partners. In addition to our President and Vice President, almost every member of the President's cabinet has traveled to Africa, bringing his or her own specific expertise. In March, the United States hosted an historic US-Africa Ministerial conference in Washington - the largest gathering of US and African officials to meet anywhere. Some 4 weeks ago, a 100-person US public and private sector delegation traveled to Botswana for the US-SADC forum ? initiating a long-term relationship with one of Africa's most critical economic and security blocks. There, we considered a regional trade and investment framework agreement, agreed to work together to counter trafficking in drugs and firearms and to coordinate efforts to combat HIV/AIDS.

Finally, the United States ? and the international community? have built a durable and long-lasting relationship with post-apartheid South Africa. This is a partnership that can help advance our shared interests not only in Africa but worldwide. The US-South Africa Binational Commission, led by Vice President Al Gore and South Africa Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, reflects the vital importance we attach to the success of the new South Africa. South Africa is the destination of 55% of US exports to Africa. Already, the United States and South Africa have signed a trade and investment framework agreement and a bilateral tax treaty. We have also concluded key civil aviation and defense trade agreements. We continue to cooperate in a range of areas ? from fighting crime to halting global weapons proliferation. With South Africa, we are building a partnership that is pragmatic and that delivers.

It is fitting to stress our enduring commitment to the new South Africa, as tonight we pay tribute to an activist from South Africa, Bram Fischer. Fischer contributed in ways both small and large to one of history's most dramatic social and political transformations. He defended Nelson Mandela against treason, and 27 years later Mandela emerged from prison to take over the presidency of a multiracial, democratic South Africa. Fischer was a Rhodes Scholar ? as well as a lawyer, an educator and an intellectual. He was also an Afrikaner, yet a man whom President Mandela described as having the credentials to be "Prime Minister of South Africa, but instead became one of the bravest and staunchest friends of the freedom struggle that he had ever known." It is in Fischer's honor and, on the eve of its second democratic election ? in South Africa's honor - that we gather here tonight.

South Africa's achievements are in a very modest way our own to cherish as well. Small groups like the Rhodes Scholars Against Apartheid and large groups throughout the world took it upon themselves ? often in defiance of their governments - to organize, boycott and protest thousands of miles away from the oppressed they sought to free. Perhaps we did so then, because we could somehow perceive what Nelson Mandela said last year when he accepted our Congressional Medal of Honor. He said: "Though the challenges of the present time for our country, our continent and the world are greater than those we have already overcome, we face the future with confidence. We do so because despite the difficulties and the tensions that confront us, there is in all of us the capacity to touch one another's hearts across oceans and continents."

That perceived capacity will continue to motivate us as we work with our African partners to promote peace, economic growth, democracy and respect for human rights throughout Africa. The United States will continue to provide support to the African people and those of their governments that take the necessary steps to meet tremendous challenges and triumph over adversity. We do so not simply as a moral imperative, but because it is manifestly in our own national interest to help build lasting prosperity and security in Africa.

Thank you.



Appendix D

Susan Rice, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Prospects for Peace in Sierra Leone
Testimony, House International Relations Committee
Subcommittee on Africa
Washington, DC, March 23, 1999

Mr. Chairman, Committee Members, thank you for providing me the opportunity to testify on the dire situation in Sierra Leone. The current civil conflict ? one of the most troubling in the world today? continues to place hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians at risk, many of them women and children. We in the Administration remain fully committed to working with Congress to help ease the humanitarian burden on the Sierra Leonean population and to end this crisis as quickly as possible. I commend you, Mr. Chairman, for helping to bring the search for peace in Sierra Leone to our nation's and the world's attention by calling this hearing today.

A month ago, Nigeria completed a fourth round of elections which you, Mr. Chairman and Representatives Payne, Meeks and Lee observed, and which has moved Nigeria closer to its first civilian government in 16 years. Let me note for the record the important role Subcommittee members played in this critical exercise by traveling to Nigeria for the presidential contest. Nigeria's transition is precarious and fragile, but its role in Sierra Leone is crucial. Nigeria is the leader of and the major troop contributor to, the Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the peacekeeping force trying to restore stability to Sierra Leone.

As part of a four-pronged strategy in Sierra Leone, we are working first to increase international support for ECOMOG. Second, we are helping regional leaders coordinate their diplomatic efforts to seek a negotiated settlement, as well as actively encouraging a swift and lasting resolution by promoting high-level dialogue with all key players. Third, we are seeking to curtail external support for the RUF (Revolutionary United Front). And, fourth, we are providing substantial humanitarian relief in those areas where security is adequate.

Background: The Origins of the Current Crisis

The war in Sierra Leone has its origins in a long history of corrupt and predatory civilian and military governments that set the stage for a decade-long insurrection, destroyed state institutions, and left the country vulnerable to external manipulation. In 1991, a small band of Sierra Leonean rebels, trained in Libya and accompanied by Burkinabe and Liberian supporters, crossed the border from Liberia with plans to overthrow the corrupt one-party All People's Congress (APC) regime headed by Major General Joseph Momoh. However, the credibility of the rebels' stated program ? to fight for democracy and fair distribution of Sierra Leone's resources? was belied by their systemic and brutal assaults against civilians. Allied with Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL), the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attacked small villages? killing, raping, mutilating and looting from Sierra Leone's most disenfranchised and destitute. They also gained control of much of the diamond-producing

region and financed their efforts through the illegal sale of diamonds, timber and other resources. In 1992, a popular military coup led by Valentine Strasser removed the APC regime. The RUF ignored offers of amnesty and a cease-fire by the new National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) government and fighting continued. The NPRC became corrupted as well and the Sierra Leone Army concentrated more on looting villages than fighting the RUF. By 1995, the RUF had control of the major diamond mining areas and was on the outskirts of the capital, Freetown. In desperation, the NPRC hired the mercenary firm Executive Outcomes (EO). Within a few weeks, EO pushed the RUF back into its base camps and restored security to most of Sierra Leone.

In early 1996, Sierra Leone's people demanded a return to democracy and celebrated their country's first free-and-fair elections in 3 decades. The democratically elected government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah took office in March and immediately began negotiations with the rebel movement, resulting in a peace agreement signed in Abidjan in November 1996. But peace and stability were short-lived. Elements of the Sierra Leone Army, styling themselves the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), overthrew the Kabbah government in May 1997, and invited the RUF to join their junta. The AFRC suspended the constitution, banned political activity, and killed, tortured, or arbitrarily detained anyone they perceived threatening their hold on power. World opinion resounded against the coup. The Sierra Leonean people stood up to the junta as well, often at the risk of their lives.

For 9 months civil servants refused to go to work, children refused to go to school, university students protested and plotted to regain freedom. After almost a year of brutal AFRC misrule, ECOMOG restored President Kabbah and his government to power in February 1998, earning commendation from the international community.

ECOMOG has played the key role in ending conflict throughout the region. Comprised of troops from several ECOWAS member-states, ECOMOG was instrumental in bringing peace to Liberia in 1997. Following a 7-year involvement bolstered by substantial logistical assistance from the United States and other donors, ECOMOG was successful in working with the United Nations and Liberians to disarm rebel factions and secure an environment conducive to conducting free elections. ECOMOG is now playing a similar role in Guinea-Bissau. Almost 600 ECOMOG troops from Togo, Niger, The Gambia and Benin recently were deployed to that country to enforce a cease-fire and support a peace agreement between belligerents.

More than 12,000 ECOMOG troops drawn from Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana and Mali, are now serving in Sierra Leone to protect the population from rebel depredations, defend the democratically elected government, and press the insurgents to the negotiating table.

For most of 1998, however, the RUF/AFRC continued its campaign against the Kabbah government and the people of Sierra Leone. They broke their commitment to implement the Abidjan Accord, which called for disarmament and demobilization, and the RUF's transformation into a political party. Instead, they attempted to regain control of Sierra Leone's rich diamond fields. Even more chilling, they embarked on "Operation No Living Thing," a campaign of terror that inflicted grave suffering on the Sierra Leonean people. Whole villages, cities and towns fled into refugee camps across borders to escape the violence. In the first half of last year, over a quarter million Sierra Leoneans fled their country to seek safety in neighboring states ? primarily Liberia and Guinea? where there are now half a million refugees from Sierra Leone.

The atrocities further galvanized Sierra Leone's people against the RUF/AFRC and heightened

public support for the Kabbah government. However, the rebels regrouped over the June-October 1998 rainy season and launched a new offensive that threatened, again, to overthrow the legitimate government.

Recent Developments

This past December, the RUF/AFRC rebel forces, with external reinforcement, marched across Sierra Leone capturing several key towns and villages, including the northern provincial capital, Makeni. With fewer than 10,000 troops on the ground, ECOMOG was unable to defend all fronts. On Christmas Eve, as rebels approached the outskirts of Freetown, the State Department ordered our American staff in Embassy Freetown to evacuate after they assisted all American citizens who wanted to leave the country. In the early hours of January 6, rebels entered the capital using, in some cases, civilians as human shields to prevent ECOMOG counterattacks. Intense fighting ensued.

The rebels attacked key facilities of the Nigerian-led ECOMOG peacekeeping force and briefly occupied the State House. The people of Freetown had no access to food, water, or electricity for more than a week. ECOMOG regained control of the capital by mid-January, but even now continues to find isolated pockets of rebels in and around Freetown. ECOMOG also controls the international airport at Lungi and major towns in the northwest, northeast and southern districts. Traditional civil defense forces have kept most southern villages secure for the past year. However, the RUF/AFRC rebels still control much of the Kailahun District on the Liberian border, the Kono diamond mining district, and Makeni. RUF forces continue to victimize innocent civilians throughout the country.

Humanitarian Situation

After months of clashes, the humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone is desperate. As the rebels withdrew from Freetown, they went on a rampage of killing, maiming and destruction. As many as 5,000 people were killed in the last 4 months of rebel attacks, and more than a thousand were subjected to atrocities, including amputation of arms, feet, hands and ears, as well as other forms of mutilation. Almost two-thirds of the buildings in eastern Freetown were destroyed in the attack. Churches, mosques, government buildings, hospitals, houses and schools were burned to the ground, in some cases, with dozens of people locked inside. Some 150,000 people were left homeless. Indeed, at one point, 40,000 people sought refuge in Freetown's National stadium.

Rebel activity has displaced nearly one-fifth of the country's 4.5 million people and sent another half million to other countries in search of refuge. In mid-February, 20,000 people were reportedly trapped between Bo, the country's second largest city, and Kenema, now under ECOMOG's control. There is a great risk of measles ? already at epidemic proportions? and other diseases that are sweeping through the camps of these displaced people and throughout the interior of the country.

Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes David Scheffer visited Freetown and refugee camps in Guinea last month where many refugees painted a horrendous picture of abuse against civilians. Ambassador Scheffer met one patient who had suffered numerous mutilations: rebels had hacked off an upper arm, cut off his tongue and placed his severed hands in his pocket.

The rebels do not discriminate. All ? women, men, young, old, and infirm? have been subjected to barbaric treatment. Children, in particular, have suffered tremendously, often at the hands of insurgents who are children themselves. Since 1991, the RUF has filled its ranks with abducted children who are sometimes compelled to brutalize or murder their own families and village elders. They are drugged, raped, used as forced labor and finally inducted into the rebel

army. Child care agencies list over 2,000 missing children after the Freetown attack. Of those, 300 parents witnessed firsthand their children's abduction by the RUF. Thousands more have been orphaned.

Attacks and kidnappings against foreigners also have been frequent since the RUF began its crusade almost 10 years ago, and in the last 4 months, the RUF kidnapped several European priests, thirteen Indian businessmen, and six nuns of the Sisters of Charity, eventually murdering seven of their captives. Two European journalists also were kidnapped and held briefly by the RUF, and an American journalist was killed January 10 while covering the fighting in Freetown. We are grateful to ECOMOG for their assistance in evacuating wounded colleagues ? an American and a Canadian.

The United Nations has reported that in the heat of the battle to dislodge the RUF from Freetown, ECOMOG and civilian vigilantes committed some summary executions of rebels and civilian collaborators. We have condemned these and all human rights violations and have urged Nigeria to investigate and punish individuals responsible for these abuses. Prompt action by ECOMOG is important to its continued credibility as a strong force for peace in the region. On this note, I am pleased to confirm that the Nigerian Government has reorganized the ECOMOG command structure and replaced the ECOMOG Force Commander. The new Force Commander, Major General Felix Mwakperu, is a graduate of the Military Policy Officer's Advanced Course (MPOAC) at Fort McClellan, Alabama.

But let me be plain: there is no comparison between ECOMOG and the RUF/AFRC insurgents. ECOMOG is a legitimate peacekeeping force with a mandate from the region and the democratically elected government of Sierra Leone, and with the support of the United Nations to restore stability and peace to Sierra Leone. ECOMOG troops generally respect the Geneva Convention and its leaders discipline soldiers who violate those standards. The RUF/AFRC, on the other hand, has purposely and systematically terrorized and brutalized tens of thousands of innocent civilians as a terror tactic to further its efforts to overthrow a democratically elected government.

US Interests

The United States has significant interests in Sierra Leone and a stake in the country's future. First, our response to the crisis is an important test of our commitment to democracy and human rights in Africa. Some 2 years ago, the overthrow of the democratic government in Sierra Leone received universal condemnation from African leaders. Sierra Leone is a test of America's commitment to democracy. Either we substantially support democratic governments, institutions and peacekeeping efforts, or we risk allowing insurgents to spread terror throughout the region. Second, we feel a compelling moral imperative to end the suffering of innocent civilians, many of whom have lived with the violent whims of armed thugs for most of this decade. Third, a lasting settlement in Sierra Leone will allow Nigerian, Ghanaian and Malian troops to return honorably to their countries. An honorable exit for Nigerian-led ECOMOG could improve prospects for a successful transition to democratic and civilian rule for Nigeria.

Conversely, a continued rebel offensive would further threaten regional stability and progress in West Africa. The conflict in Sierra Leone could easily cross borders, spilling into Guinea and potentially re-igniting civil war in Liberia. It could adversely affect our allies in the region, including Nigeria, Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana, and other countries of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Continued hostilities could thwart ECOWAS' ongoing efforts to integrate their economies more effectively.

Mr. Chairman, the implications of a rebel victory in Sierra Leone for our long-term engagement in Africa would be serious, indeed. The fall of the Kabbah government would be a major setback for ECOMOG troop-contributing nations, most especially for Nigeria. Further, it could jeopardize our burgeoning relationship with Nigeria's newly elected civilian government. It could weaken democratic governments elsewhere in the region and threaten ECOMOG's future peacekeeping prospects. Under RUF control, Sierra Leone would again descend into chaos, and its rich resources would be exploited to further the terror of the RUF and provide an attractive environment for criminals and terrorists.

Finally, the United States has longstanding ties to the people of Sierra Leone. Freetown, Sierra Leone's capital, was founded in 1792 as the Province of Freedom by Thomas Peters, an African-American from Wilmington, North Carolina. More recently, Sierra Leone responded to our direct request and sent a contingent of doctors and staff to Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War. On several occasions, Sierra Leone helped the US evacuate American citizens from the civil war in Liberia, providing us unrestricted access to its international airport and port facilities. Without the use of Sierra Leone as a platform, the ECOMOG peacekeeping operation in Liberia would not have succeeded.

US Role

The United States has been actively involved in Sierra Leone over the past 4 years to try to end rebel hostilities, consolidate democracy and promote national reconciliation. First, the Administration provided logistical and communications support for the elections in 1996. After the May 1997 coup, we joined ECOWAS, the Organization of African Unity, the United Nations and the rest of the international community, in condemning the overthrow of the elected government and to press for its restoration. The UN Security Council, led by the United States and the United Kingdom, adopted targeted sanctions in October 1997 against the junta and authorized ECOWAS to enforce them. After the restoration of the democratic government, we supported ECOMOG's Sierra Leone operation with critical nonlethal logistical assistance to help it respond effectively to the rebels' "Operation No Living Thing" campaign. We provided the peacekeeping force \$3.9 million in communications, transportation equipment and other logistical services ? including helicopter lift in fiscal year 1998.

On the humanitarian front, the United States is Sierra Leone's largest bilateral donor. We contributed over \$55 million in humanitarian assistance during Fiscal Year 1998, including substantial food aid for refugees. The Department of Defense airlifted emergency medical supplies and equipment, USAID funded NGOs that deployed medical personnel and provided medical supplies and prosthetic devices, as well as a helicopter to airlift mutilation "Operation No Living Thing" victims to medical facilities.

Multilaterally and bilaterally the United States is working to strengthen ECOMOG's capacity to protect the people of Sierra Leone and their democratically elected government from being overrun by brutal insurgents.

We are working to end the support of external players who are fueling the crisis by backing rebel forces. At the same time, and despite the international community's abhorrence of rebels' actions, we are urging all players to come to the negotiating table to end the mayhem. Finally, the United States is continuing to respond to the humanitarian needs of the Sierra Leonean people who have suffered for too long.

1) Further Support for ECOMOG: Resources are Key

While ECOMOG is leading peacekeeping/security efforts in Sierra Leone, the region cannot establish peace without help from the international community. This fiscal year, the State Department has already committed \$4 million of nonlethal logistical support to assist ECOMOG's operation in Sierra Leone and another \$1 million for medical supplies and equipment to treat Nigerian ECOMOG troops wounded during the RUF offensive against Freetown. In addition, the Administration will soon formally notify Congress of our intention to allocate another \$5.8 million to assist ECOMOG. Great Britain has joined us in generously supporting this effort and recently announced an additional 10 million pounds sterling of assistance for ECOMOG and for the training of a new Sierra Leone Army.

This is a challenge grant. Great Britain will disperse these funds as other donors contribute to Sierra Leone. In addition, the international community also has contributed another 10 million dollar to support ECOMOG. The Netherlands, Canada, Norway, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy and China have provided or indicated their intent to provide ECOMOG with direct assistance including balance-of-payments support to troop-contributing countries, transport of country contingents to Sierra Leone, and nonlethal military equipment.

2) Negotiating a Solution

Second, we continue to support actively regional efforts to forge a diplomatic solution. We are encouraging the ECOWAS Secretary General and the Governments of Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali and Togo to coordinate their strategy on Sierra Leone. We have facilitated communications between the rebels and Government of Sierra Leone to begin a dialogue on peace. In this regard, the President's Special Envoy for the Promotion of Democracy Reverend Jesse Jackson, West African Affairs Director Ambassador Howard Jeter and Ambassador Joseph Melrose, in conjunction with UN Special Representative of the Secretary General Francis Okelo and ECOWAS Executive Secretary Lansana Kouyate, have all been working to help regional leaders and the RUF agree on a suitable venue and timing for peace consultations. Ambassador Jeter also has facilitated talks between President Kabbah, the Nigerians and the RUF's legal representative, and recently spent 2 weeks in West Africa to push this process along. Finally, Special Envoy Jackson has spoken frequently with President Kabbah to encourage his continued flexibility as regional leaders try to facilitate a dialogue leading to a long-term resolution of the conflict.

A meeting between RUF leader Foday Sankoh and RUF senior commanders is critical to clarifying the RUF's agenda and lines of authority. We urge the government and RUF to ensure this meeting happens quickly - it is an essential first step to what will be a long process. We underscore the importance of the RUF undertaking consultations and negotiations in good faith. President Kabbah has agreed to allow RUF leader Foday Sankoh to speak with the BBC and have radio and phone contact with rebel commanders in the bush. The president of Sierra Leone also announced that he would consider using his constitutional authority to release Foday Sankoh if doing so would help bring about sustainable peace. This is a welcome move.

Although our embassy operations are suspended, our ambassador to Sierra Leone, Joseph Melrose, based in Conakry, Guinea, makes regular trips to Freetown. Last month he also accompanied Ambassador Scheffer to the capital. In July, Reverend Jesse Jackson facilitated a meeting between President Taylor of Liberia and President Kabbah to discuss national differences. On November 22, Reverend Jackson also helped arrange a meeting in Conakry among the presidents of Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia to forge an agreement to respect each other's sovereignty and borders, and visited Freetown to meet with President Kabbah, civil

society leaders and atrocity victims. We intend to continue funding conflict resolution programs through USAID's Office of Transitional Initiatives to encourage dialogue among all sectors of Sierra Leone society should a settlement be achieved.

3) Halt Support to the Rebels

Third, external support to the rebel forces must be curtailed. We have clear evidence of Liberian involvement with the RUF and have reports that Libya and Burkina Faso may also be assisting the rebels. Additionally, we believe the RUF has secured the services of foreign mercenaries and is financing much of its operation by illicit diamond sales. The United States has pressed Liberia to cease its assistance and is prepared to consider punitive measures against President Charles Taylor's government if support for the rebels is not terminated. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering and I each met with Liberian Foreign Minister Captan on February 11 to reinforce this message. The Administration welcomes the Foreign Minister's assurances and other recent signs that suggest Liberia may retract its support. We call upon the Liberian Government, at this critical time in our bilateral relationship, to fulfill its promises ? and swiftly. We continue to hope that we can work constructively with Liberia and its government to foster regional peace and security, but we will not tolerate further support for the rebels in Sierra Leone.

4) Humanitarian Response

Finally, the war in Sierra Leone has been, above all, a humanitarian disaster. The State Department and USAID have provided nearly \$32 million in humanitarian assistance since October, and we will continue to increase our emergency assistance as the security situation improves and relief agencies gain access to new areas.

Working with NGOs, for example, the United States quickly responded to the needs of war-affected populations in Sierra Leone. In January, we deployed a medical team to Nigeria with four tons of supplies and equipment to help treat wounded Nigerian troops and a two-person Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) team to Conakry, Guinea to coordinate and report on humanitarian efforts. To date in FY 1999, USAID/BHR/OFDA has programmed nearly \$8.0 million to NGOs and UN agencies to provide health, water, sanitation, agriculture, coordination, non-food and logistical support to affected populations in Sierra Leone. In addition, OFDA procured and transported 1,060 rolls of plastic sheeting and 50,000 blankets to provide temporary shelter for displaced populations in Freetown and upcountry. Although hospitals are reportedly overcrowded and severely understaffed, relief organizations are addressing urgent public health needs. Medical supplies and personnel have reached most of the critically injured. Large quantities of US food have been distributed to the 150,000 displaced people of Freetown, and the State Department is providing \$2 million to UNHCR to address added needs of Sierra Leone refugees in Guinea.

However, the lack of security poses continued problems for relief operations throughout the country. Dangerous conditions forced humanitarian workers to flee for safety. Humanitarian agencies have access to only 300,000 of the nearly one million internally displaced persons. Sierra Leone's neighbors host almost half a million refugees. Security outside of Freetown is especially precarious and is preventing delivery of assistance to the wounded and hungry in the interior. We continue to assess the humanitarian situation and provide support to Sierra Leoneans most in peril, and improve coordination between all players, especially ECOMOG and NGOs, so that aid can be dispersed quickly and effectively. However, relief efforts can only go so far. A viable cease-fire which allows free movement for all citizens as well as humanitarian workers is surely needed.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, this is a critical time in our relations with Africa. Just last week, the Secretary of State hosted an historic US-Africa Ministerial Conference. Over 120 African government ministers and ambassadors, President Clinton, and 8 of his Cabinet officials had the opportunity to discuss in detail the US-Africa partnership and our common goals for the future.

Notwithstanding our deepening ties, we realize that conflict in many regions has recently overshadowed the progress the vast majority of Africans have made in recent years toward more inclusive societies and stronger economics.

Throughout history, we have learned that problems abroad, left unattended, will come back to haunt our people and stall our progress. Still, there are those who may question our interest in a far-off civil war in a corner of Africa. But this is a new moment in history, and a new, fragile democracy in Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone is surrounded by nascent and would-be democracies and free-market economies. We should not turn our backs on America's interests and in our fundamental principles of freedom, tolerance and the rights of all people to pursue their individual and collective security and welfare.

We should defend our interest in democracy worldwide, by not bowing to a brutal insurgent group intent on overthrowing a democratically elected government. We should help protect thousands of innocent victims from heinous atrocities. Finally, we should protect our interest in building and sustaining Africa's peacekeeping capacities, which are key to security throughout the continent, by ensuring that ECOMOG has the tools necessary to complete its important mission in Sierra Leone. If we succeed, we will help bolster West Africa with another democratic government, strong regional conflict resolution capabilities, greater regional integration, and a confident Nigeria departing Sierra Leone on high ground and ready to redirect energy and resources toward forging its own new destiny. I therefore look forward to working with this Subcommittee to respond effectively to the far-reaching implications of this crisis for all our peoples.

Thank you.



Appendix E

Susan E. Rice, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
The Ethiopian-Eritrean War: US Policy Options
Testimony, House International Relations Committee
Africa Subcommittee
Washington, DC, May 25, 1999

Introduction

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to testify today on the conflict in the Horn of Africa. Much like the crisis in Sierra Leone, which I had the opportunity to discuss with your subcommittee members 2 months ago, the war in the Horn of Africa threatens a broad swath of Africa as well as United States' interests in the region as a whole.

The Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, which began in May 1998, has substantially damaged the economic growth and development of Ethiopia and Eritrea and has led to humanitarian suffering on both sides of the border. Tens of thousands of lives have been lost and thousands more have been maimed.

The United States and others in the international community have consistently called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and speedy implementation of the Organization of African Unity's Framework Agreement. We continue to work with the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity to secure and implement a lasting peace.

Origins of the Conflict/Escalations of Hostilities

The origins of the war are complex. During the 1980s, two liberation fronts, the Tigray People's Liberation Front and the Eritrea People's Liberation Front, joined forces against Ethiopian dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam, although differences between the two led to occasional disputes. Mengistu's brutal Derg regime was toppled in 1991, and Eritrea gained formal independence in 1993. As a result, Ethiopia became landlocked, with a common border established almost 100 years ago between the Italian colony of Eritrea and Ethiopia never fully and precisely delineated or demarcated.

It is important to note that the two new governments enjoyed such strong bilateral relations that neither they nor the international community considered formal determination of the border an immediate priority.

In the year leading to the outbreak of fighting, relations between the two former allies deteriorated, exacerbated by economic tensions. A border skirmish occurred on May 6, 1998 at Badme. A week later, Eritrea sent troops and armor into and beyond Badme into territory administered by Ethiopia. After several weeks of fighting, several areas previously administered by Ethiopia – the Badme area and areas near Zela Ambessa and Bure, south of the port of Assab – fell under Eritrean control.

As the ground fighting escalated, in June of 1998, Ethiopia launched airstrikes against Asmara

airport. Eritrea made retaliatory strikes against the Ethiopian towns of Mekele and Adigrat, south of Zela Ambessa, hitting a school. Both sides then agreed to a US-brokered airstrike moratorium, and fighting decreased to occasional exchanges of artillery and small-arms fire over a 9-month period.

Both Ethiopia and Eritrea used the intervening months to acquire new military stockpiles, including state-of-the-art fighter aircraft and artillery, and to recruit, train and deploy tens of thousands of new soldiers. The United States actively discouraged suppliers to both parties and the UN Security Council urged governments not to provide weapons to exacerbate the problem. Publicly, Ethiopia continued to demand a complete and absolute return to the status quo ante of May 6, 1998. Eritrea insisted that some of the area it occupied after May 6, 1998 was Eritrean territory.

Fighting resumed on February 6, 1999 when Ethiopian forces attacked, eventually displacing Eritrean forces from the disputed area of Badme. Ethiopia employed fighter-bombers, helicopter gunships and reconfigured transport aircraft in tactical support of ground operations. Ethiopia later launched an unsuccessful counter-offensive on the Zela Ambessa front in mid-March. Eritrea failed to re-take Badme in subsequent fighting at the end of March. In April, Ethiopia struck an Eritrean military training facility and other targets deep within Eritrea. A week and a half ago, Ethiopian aircraft bombed sites at Zela Ambessa, Badme and the port of Massawa.

Although there has been a lull in the ground fighting over the past few weeks, press reports from yesterday indicate there were clashes between ground forces this past weekend at Badme.

United States' Interests

The United States has significant interests in ending the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea as soon as possible. The current conflict threatens regional stability and threatens to reverse Ethiopian and Eritrean progress in economic and political development.

The United States has important national security interests in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia's and Eritrea's neighbor, Sudan, has long supported international terrorism, fostered the spread of Islamic extremism beyond its borders, actively worked to destabilize neighboring states, including Ethiopia and Eritrea, and perpetrated massive human rights violations against its own citizens. Since the conflict began last year, Sudan has increasingly benefited from the hostilities between its former adversaries. Eritrea recently signed an accord with Sudan to normalize relations. Ethiopia has renewed air service to Khartoum and has made overtures to Sudan for improved relations as well. Both sides have moved to reduce support to Sudanese opposition groups.

Eritrea's President Isaias has made several trips to Libya ? Africa's other state sponsor of terrorism? for frequent consultations with Colonel Qadhafi, and has joined Qadhafi's "Community of Saharan and Sahelian States."

We are very concerned by credible reports that Eritrea has delivered large quantities of weapons and munitions to self-proclaimed Somalia President Hussein Aideed for the use of a violent faction of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). The terrorist organization Al-Ittihad may also be an indirect recipient of these arms. Ethiopia also is shipping arms to factions in Somalia. The recent upsurge of violence in Somalia is, in part, related to these new developments.

Increased activity by a violent faction of the OLF in the south and the east has led to crossborder raids by Ethiopian security forces along its frontiers with Kenya and Somalia. These developments clearly reflect a dangerous trend.

Prior to this conflict, Ethiopia and Eritrea played a constructive role in the Great Lakes region. Their current dispute with each other has precluded them from continuing to take such a role in this volatile area and other areas of the continent where we had foreseen mutually beneficial cooperation.

The security costs of the conflict are matched, if not exceeded, by the grave humanitarian consequences of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Tens of thousands of lives have been lost and hundreds of thousands displaced. Approximately 300,000 Ethiopian and 100,000 to 200,000 Eritrean civilians have been forced from their homes and fields near the border by the conflict. An estimated 60,000 Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean descent have been deported from Ethiopia to Eritrea, and an estimated 20,000 Ethiopians have left Eritrea under duress. We have made clear that we consider the practice of deportation to be a fundamental violation of individual rights. The nature of these expulsions and the arrangements made for transfer and holding of property were clearly susceptible to abuse.

United States' Response

Immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities in May 1998, I led two interagency missions to Ethiopia and Eritrea to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the dispute. Working with the Government of Rwanda, we proposed a series of steps to end the conflict in accordance with both sides' shared principles and international law. These recommendations, endorsed by the OAU and the UNSC, later informed development by the OAU of its Framework Agreement. These initial missions also resulted in agreement by the two parties to the airstrike moratorium, which remained in effect until February 6, 1999. Beginning in October, President Clinton sent former National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and an interagency team from the State Department, the National Security Council and the Department of Defense on four missions to Ethiopia and Eritrea, the most recent occurring in early 1999. We are grateful for Mr. Lake's tireless work on behalf of the President and the Secretary of State. His intensive efforts, which still continue, have been aimed at helping both sides find a mutually agreed basis for resolving the dispute without further loss of life. Working closely with the OAU and the UNSC, Mr. Lake and our team put forth numerous proposals to both sides consistent with the OAU Framework. In December, Ethiopia formally accepted the Framework Agreement. Eritrea did not, requesting clarification on numerous specific questions.

Fighting resumed on February 6 while UN envoy Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun was in the region still seeking a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Following this first phase of fighting, Eritrean troops were compelled to withdraw from Badme ? an important element of the draft OAU Framework Agreement. Subsequent Eritrean acceptance of the Framework was welcomed by the United States and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) but was greeted with skepticism by Ethiopia. Ethiopia instead demanded Eritrea's unconditional, unilateral withdrawal from all contested areas that Ethiopia had administered prior to last May.

On April 14, Prime Minister Meles of Ethiopia offered a cease-fire in return for an explicit commitment by Eritrea to remove its forces unilaterally from contested areas. He later added that Eritrean withdrawal must occur within an undefined but "short" period.

Eritrea continues to demand a cease-fire prior to committing to withdraw from disputed territories. Ethiopia insists that a cease-fire and implementation of the OAU Framework Agreement can only

follow an explicit Eritrean commitment to withdraw from all territories occupied since the conflict erupted on May 6, 1998.

Conclusion

A joint Organization of African Unity/United Nations effort to urge both sides to accept a cease-fire and begin implementing the framework agreement continues. The United States Government remains actively engaged, in support of the OAU, with both Eritrea and Ethiopia to secure a peace settlement.

There is a need, however, to not only end the conflict as quickly as possible but also ultimately to repair, over the long-term, strained relations in the Horn. A resolution of the border war may be attainable. The task of rebuilding both countries and mending ties between Ethiopia and Eritrea to ensure long-term sustained peace and mutual security will be especially difficult. It will require due attention and support from the United States and the international community. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to continuing to work with you and other members of this subcommittee as we continue to pursue our shared interest in forging a peaceful resolution to this tragic conflict.



Appendix F

Susan E. Rice, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
**Central African Conflict and Its Implications for Africa
and for the Future of US Policy Goals and Strategies**
Testimony, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Subcommittee on African Affairs
Washington, DC, June 8, 1999

(Introductory remarks deleted)

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is home to roughly 50 million people and borders nine other countries. It is an integral member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). With its vast mineral, agricultural and water resources, the country has the potential to serve as an economic powerhouse ? to improve the lives not only of its own citizens but of many of its neighbors. Its political course and economic prospects will directly influence the stability of much of the rest of Africa. The opportunity costs of Congo becoming a failed or fragmented state are huge. The direct costs in terms of lives and destruction, I presume, would be self-evident.

The Conflict in the Congo

The current conflict in the Congo is the widest interstate war in Africa in modern history and potentially one of the most dangerous conflicts in the world today. It is unique in its complexity and in the multiplicity of actors.

There have been at least eight foreign countries directly involved in the fighting in Congo. There is also a plethora of nonstate actors engaged in the conflict, including UNITA, the ex-FAR/Interahamwe, numerous Sudanese-backed Ugandan rebel organizations and others. The Congo crisis is bleeding over into other regional conflicts. The result is a swath of interlocking wars involving Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Angola, extending from the Horn to the Atlantic. It puts at risk the futures not only of the people of the Congo, but the peoples of all nine countries on its periphery. It is no exaggeration to suggest that if the conflict persists, much of Southern, Eastern and Central Africa could be adversely affected. It has set back economic development and retarded efforts to strengthen regional cooperation.

The ultimate path out, outlined further in this presentation, lies in achieving a comprehensive settlement. That is the end goal which guides President Chiluba and our accompanying efforts. Over the past 10 months, we have not shied away from that goal, but we recognize the complexity and difficulty of achieving quick progress. Therefore, we have focused our thinking as well on realistic intermediate targets of opportunity that can create new facts on the ground. We've pushed for the beginning of an internal Congolese dialogue, without serious preconditions. We have suggested to Congo and its neighbors that think in earnest how they might reach regional compacts that put in place a new security architecture to address the vacuum in eastern Congo. When broken down into its component parts, this conflict can become less hopeless and more soluble.

The Congo crisis is the result of the intersection of two developments: (1) the political and institutional vacuum that was the legacy of 30 years of Mobutu's corrupt and tyrannical rule; and (2) the use of Congo by various insurgent groups to destabilize neighboring states.

A number of the countries surrounding the Congo have been plagued by insurgencies and armed conflict. Of these, none has been more intractable and more destabilizing than the bloody conflicts between Tutsi and Hutu in Burundi and in Rwanda. In 1972, an estimated 150,000 Burundian Hutus were the victims of genocide; then, in 1994, at least 800,000 Rwandans (mostly Tutsi) were slaughtered in a genocide organized by the Hutu government then in power. It is difficult to overstate the continuing traumatic impact of that event for Rwanda and for the region. Then, in 1996, violent inter-ethnic conflict came directly to Congolese soil, in the form of the expulsion of Congolese Tutsis in the Masisi region. This event was the backdrop to the Banyamulenge-led and externally supported rebellion that led to Mobutu's ouster.

Today, there are two broad coalitions facing each other in the Congo conflict that erupted last August: President Kabila's government and his principal allies of Zimbabwe, Chad, Angola and Namibia on the one hand, and the rebel/Uganda/Rwanda coalition on the other. Each side has internal divisions of its own, based on their quite different interests and perspectives. On the Congolese side, Chad and Angola have effectively withdrawn from active participation in the conflict. On the opposing side, schisms between Rwanda and Uganda as well as among the rebels have led to the emergence of several competing factions.

After months of diplomatic and military stagnation, several recent developments suggest there has been a shift in thinking within the region ? in favor of political and diplomatic action, versus overwhelming reliance on armed force. On April 18 in Sirte, Libya, Congo, Uganda and Chad signed an agreement calling for a cessation of hostilities, the deployment of an African peacekeeping force, and the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan troops. Chad subsequently began withdrawing its troops and Uganda has since generally avoided fighting. Perhaps most importantly, on May 28, Rwanda declared a unilateral cessation of hostilities, a move which triggered a flurry of diplomatic activity and could help re-energize regional peace efforts. The United States subsequently pressed other parties to the conflict to welcome the Rwandan announcement and reciprocate by refraining from further offensive operations as well as to redouble their efforts to reach an agreement on a cease-fire and the withdrawal of foreign troops. A SADC summit is scheduled for late June in Lusaka to try yet again to reach a cease-fire agreement. Still, reports of Congolese bombing of Uvira and Bukavu, as well as unconfirmed reports that rebels shot down Zimbabwean aircraft May 29 or 30, and unconfirmed allegations of Rwandan shelling of allied positions since the cease-fire announcement, leave the true situation on the ground murky.

While the warring parties may be more inclined to negotiate now than at any time since the war began, there are still numerous obstacles to a comprehensive and sustainable peace. Among them is the fact that the main rebel group ? the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) - recently split over the question of whether to negotiate or seek a military victory. RCD hard-liners have associated themselves with neither the Sirte agreement nor the Rwandan declaration, although their ability to conduct major military operations without external support is uncertain.

Implications

The costs of the continuation of this conflict are potentially huge. It threatens to roll back recent economic and political gains across much of Africa. It constitutes a massive drain on resources urgently needed for development. Continued instability is scaring away foreign investment and could spark secondary economic and/or political crises from Zimbabwe to Uganda. Ethnic

violence has been a perennial feature of recent conflicts in Central Africa and this most recent Congo crisis is no exception. Thousands of innocent civilians have been killed in Congo. The Congo Government has actively armed and trained 10,000-15,000 Interahamwe militia, many of whom participated in the 1994 genocide.

Historically, Congo has been at the heart of successive scrambles for Africa. Today, those with economic and political designs on the Congo come not from Europe but from within the African continent itself. A political vacuum in the heart of Africa is a perfect setting not only for various state and nonstate actors to replenish themselves and rebuild strength, but an attractive venue for other groups with aims that directly threaten US interests.

Growing Libyan involvement in DRC may only be the forerunner of much more. Sudan's involvement is yet another example of that government's attempt to destabilize its neighbors by using the cover of its support for the Congo to provide additional aid to insurgent groups in Uganda. The Congo war also contributes both to the intensity and possibly the duration of the Angolan civil war ? UNITA has found new allies and is gaining from divisions among states within the region. The conflict also has the potential to adversely affect Burundi's peace process. Finally, rearmed and retrained ex-FAR and Interahamwe are a tremendously destabilizing factor for the entire Great Lakes region. The threat of renewed genocide, therefore, remains real.

US and International Response

Efforts to end the war began almost immediately after the conflict began in August. There have been dozens of meetings of regional leaders in various cities under different auspices. However, seldom did all necessary players participate. The rebels were excluded from all but one meeting. SADC has become the accepted vehicle for ending the conflict, with Zambian President Chiluba assuming the leading role. Mozambican President Chissano and Tanzanian President Mkapa are assisting President Chiluba, and the United Nations has recently appointed a special envoy, former Senegalese Foreign Minister Niasse, to determine how the UN might support regional efforts to broker a peace settlement.

From the start of the Congo crisis, the US has pursued an active diplomatic strategy in support of our objectives. Beginning last August, we have provided full support for the regional initiative taken by SADC and the OAU. Last fall, I traveled to seven of the nations involved in the conflict. Shortly thereafter, Rwanda acknowledged its presence in the Congo —which eliminated one of the major obstacles to the peace process. Under Secretary of State Tom Pickering met with several leaders of countries involved in the conflict last September during the UN General Assembly, and visited Harare in February to underscore the important role Zimbabwe must play to end the conflict.

During the US-Africa Ministerial in March, I and others met with dozens of senior government officials from Angola, Zambia, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, the Congo, Uganda and Chad to press specific proposals for achieving a negotiated settlement. Secretary Albright has personally and repeatedly underscored US concerns in conversations and correspondence with President Kabila, President Museveni, United Nations Secretary General Annan, OAU Secretary General Salim Salim, and other African leaders. And, the President's Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, Howard Wolpe, has spent almost 2 weeks of every month since last summer shuttling between capitals to try to advance a cease-fire agreement that is acceptable to all sides. Most recently, 10 days ago in Abuja, on the margins of the inauguration of the new civilian government in Nigeria, the US delegation met with the presidents of Congo, Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique and Zimbabwe to urge progress in the wake of the Rwandan cease-fire declaration.

US Interests and Objectives

Throughout, US policy objectives in the Congo have been consistent and clear. We seek peace, prosperity, democracy and respect for fundamental human rights. We have affirmed our support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Congo. We have repeatedly condemned any violation of this fundamental principle of both the United Nations Charter and the Organization of African Unity.

We have worked to counter those who would perpetuate genocide in the region. We have encouraged the establishment of an inclusive political transition that would end the cycle of violence and impunity; build respect for the rule of law and human rights; and create the conditions for lasting development and reconstruction. As a consequence, we have been committed to a policy of engagement in support of the Congolese people who suffered so much under Mobutu Sese Seko's tyranny.

Our immediate objectives include:

- A peaceful, negotiated end of the war;
- Preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
- The resolution of border security issues affecting the Congo and its neighboring states;
- Curbing ethnic strife and preventing the resurgence of genocide in the region;
- The institutionalization of democratic processes, the rule of law and respect for fundamental human rights in the Congo, and indeed, across the region; and
- The economic reconstruction and development of the country.

While a comprehensive settlement comprising these elements is our ultimate objective, our immediate challenge is to set ? and achieve? realistic intermediate targets that change the facts on the ground. Rwanda's acknowledgement of its presence in Congo, and its subsequent cessation of hostilities announcement, are two examples of such targets that have been met. We —along with our African partners and other friends of Congo in the international community— must work together to identify and bring about other steps to move the belligerents toward a comprehensive solution. We cannot lose sight of the continued need for a meaningful constructive role by the United Nations. In the medium to long term, it will be dangerous for Africa and for the world at large if the UN becomes marginalized from the management of crises. For this reason, we have been encouraged by the UN Secretary General's (SYG) appointment of Special Envoy Niasse, and have encouraged a very active engagement by the UN SYG.

In the longer term, our objectives are equally clear. We seek to strengthen the process of internal reconciliation and democratization within all of the states of the region, so as to reduce the tensions and conflicts that fuel insurgent movements. In short, we seek stable, economically self-reliant and democratic nations with which we can work to address our mutual economic and security interests on the continent. A stable and democratic Congo can contribute powerfully to regional stability. Its economic promise is even greater, with enormous benefits for US economic interests as well as for the African continent in general.

However, Congo's potential can only be realized in the context of a negotiated cease-fire and comprehensive political settlement that takes account both of the legitimate concerns of Congo's neighbors and the internal political conditions that helped precipitate the crisis. For a resolution to be durable, any solution must also address the issue of ex-FAR, Interahamwe, UNITA, and other nonstate actors.

We are encouraging the states in the region to implement a security compact to contain and halt the nonstate immediately following a cease-fire. The formidable nature of the challenge these nonstate actors pose will make the erection of the required security architecture a difficult undertaking. We stand ready to support the region in its efforts to develop such an agreement.

Next Steps

To summarize, any sustainable resolution of the DRC conflict will require successful implementation of these distinct, but related, processes:

- A cease-fire among the external parties, the Congo Government, and the rebels.
- An open and inclusive internal political process that will credibly engage the government, rebels, the unarmed political opposition, and civil society. This process must lead to a transition to a democratic state respecting fundamental citizenship rights of all Congolese.
- The organization of a security compact among regional states to address the problem of the ex-Far/Interahamwe, UNITA, and other nonstate actors.
- In addition, a settlement may require the insertion of an international peacekeeping presence to monitor the cease-fire, eventual withdrawal of foreign troops and the exchange of prisoners, as well as lend confidence to the Congolese during the transition.

Conclusion

Let me conclude by underscoring our recognition of the fact that Africans themselves will plot their own destiny ? their own paths toward peace and stability. Neither the United States nor any external actor can wave a magic wand and resolve this conflict for the people of the Congo or for the region. The people and leaders in the region must do so for themselves. For our part, we will continue to do all we can to help.

Mr. Chairman, all the African countries and the leaders of the Congo who have contributed to the current crisis stand at a perilous crossroads. They themselves must determine whether to continue on the present violent path to the detriment of their people or step away from military action and work in concert to find a viable diplomatic solution.

We will continue to lend strong US support to ongoing diplomatic initiatives to bring all sides to a peaceful settlement. These efforts are the only viable way to resolve the current crisis in Central Africa. I look forward to working with members of this Subcommittee, as always, to do our utmost to help the countries and parties in the region to address the challenges before the Democratic Republic of the Congo and, more broadly, before Central and Southern Africa.

Thank you.



Appendix G

Ambassador Howard Jeter
Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Nigeria: On the Democracy Path?
Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee
Subcommittee on Africa
August 3, 1999, Washington, DC

Introduction

Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. It is indeed a pleasure to address the House Subcommittee on Africa on Nigeria's prospects for democracy and stability. Just a year and a half ago, Nigeria was still ruled by one of Africa's harshest dictators, going down a treacherous path of continued economic and political decay and international isolation. Yet last February, Nigerians went to the polls to elect their first civilian democratic president and legislature in over 15 years. Let me take the opportunity to commend you, Mr. Royce, and Representatives Payne, Meeks and Lee for the valuable role you played as election observers. Although far from perfect, the contest signaled the first step in Nigeria's successful transition to civilian democracy. On May 29, a significant number of world leaders traveled to the inauguration of President Olusegun Obasanjo. Despite daunting challenges, we believe Nigeria now has the best chance in decades to turn to a new democratic chapter in its history, and to begin finally to realize its enormous potential to bring greater prosperity and stability to its own people and to others on the continent.

Mr. Chairman, US goals in Nigeria prior to the transition as well as today remain constant. We seek a stable Nigeria that respects human rights, promotes democracy and enhances the welfare of its people. We also have sought better cooperation with the Government of Nigeria in combating international narcotics trafficking and crime. We hope to be in a position to promote favorable trade and investment partnerships in the largest economy on the continent. Finally, we hope Nigeria will continue to play a responsible role in resolving regional conflicts. Nigeria's successful transformation is key to anchoring the climate of peace and rapid development that our citizens hope to see throughout Africa and, thus, central to meeting all our economic, security and political objectives in the region.

Thus, Secretary Albright has designated Nigeria as one of four priority countries in the world, along with Colombia, Ukraine and Indonesia, whose democratic transition we have a vital national interest in backing. A number of senior Administration officials, including Under Secretary Thomas Pickering, then-Under Secretary Stuart Eizenstat, Transportation Secretary Slater and Commerce Secretary Daley have traveled to Nigeria over the course of a year to discuss long-term US-Nigerian engagement. President Clinton, Secretary of State Albright and Treasury Secretary Rubin met with President-elect Obasanjo on March 30, and assured him we would provide continued and active support at this critical juncture in Nigeria's history.

Finally, at the President's request, an Interagency Assessment Team which I co-led traveled to Nigeria from June 19 to July 2 to explore with the Nigerian Government, civil society leaders,

and the US and Nigerian business communities proactive assistance programs this year and beyond.

United States Interests

We are investing this high-level commitment in Nigeria because the stakes are so high. A democratic Nigeria is key to a stable and prosperous West Africa, an invigorated Africa, and to US national and economic security. Nigeria is our second largest trading partner in all of Africa. American companies have invested over \$7 billion in the country's petroleum sector; we import approximately 40% of Nigeria's oil production, and Nigeria supplies nearly 8% of our total oil imports. Nigeria is large and influential, with an ancient culture, tremendous human talent, and enormous wealth.

The most populous African nation, Nigeria is home to more than 100 million people, with over 250 ethnic groups and an abundance of natural resources. Equally important, Nigeria is a major force in the sub-region and has played an invaluable role in helping to bring stability to this volatile neighborhood. It has been the major troop contributor to the peacekeeping force of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). In Liberia, for example, Nigeria actively supported the peace process by contributing over 75% of the ECOMOG peacekeeping troops and by helping to enable internationally observed and transparent elections. Nigeria's support for peacekeeping in Liberia lasted for nearly 8 years. Led by Nigeria, ECOMOG also was instrumental in restoring the legitimate Sierra Leone Government in March of last year. Over the past year and a half, its troops have remained in-country to defend and protect the Sierra Leonean population, uphold the democratically elected government, and press the rebels to the negotiating table. Indeed, the July 7 Lome Peace Accord signed between rebel leader Foday Sankoh and President Kabbah is due, in large part, to Nigeria's sustained and proactive efforts, and Africans and members of the international community should be grateful.

The United States has supported ECOMOG over the years with significant logistical assistance, over \$110 million for its efforts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, but the greater brunt of costs in both lives and dollars has been borne by Nigeria. With a resolution of the conflict in Sierra Leone, Nigeria hopes to be able to divert more resources to its own internal reconciliation and reconstruction efforts.

Recent Progress

Nigeria's new leadership deserves enormous credit for last year's transition. Against considerable odds, General Abdulsalam Abubakar effectively guided the process, releasing political prisoners, persuading the military to make concessions, and working with the World Bank and IMF to improve the economy. Under his guidance, for example, Nigeria abolished the dual exchange rate, deregulated gasoline prices, and began to restructure the centrally controlled economy.

The United States is encouraged by President Obasanjo's first moves as Head of State. He has taken a prominent leadership role in the region, begun work to address corruption and past human rights abuses (to strengthen and consolidate civilian control of the military), and personally has urged the reconciliation of disparate elements of society. For example, the President established a committee to review all government contracts since 1976 and has retired senior military officers who played central roles in previous military regimes. On June 10, he traveled to the Niger Delta for a first-hand look at the devastation resulting from a new round of ethnic conflict in that region. He visited Sierra Leone, Togo and other key states in West Africa to jump-start Nigeria's critical diplomatic role in Sierra Leone's peace process. President Obasanjo also has begun a serious effort to seek rapprochement and reconciliation between Nigeria and Liberia, symbolized by his presence at Liberia's National Day Celebration and the symbolic destruction of the arsenal

of weapons confiscated at the end of Liberia's civil war. The United States supports what appears to be promising domestic and foreign policy progress in Nigeria.

Looking Ahead: Nigeria's Challenges

President Obasanjo must deal effectively and immediately with two overriding issues — corruption and the professionalization of the military— to win the time, space and political support he will need to confront the difficult but essential issue of economic reform and national reconciliation.

Corruption

Nigeria's leadership has begun to address both systemic and entrenched corruption and civil-military relations. With the former, President Obasanjo has a momentous task ahead of him; corruption in Nigeria is longstanding and pervasive. In addition to setting up a panel to review all government contracts over a span of 20 years, including those awarded during his own previous term as Head of State, President Obasanjo has suspended all contracts and appointments made by the last military regime. He also has committed to setting up an anti-corruption agency and introduced an anti-corruption bill in Parliament. To stem graft, government officials have shown an interest in establishing institutional mechanisms similar to our own Office of Management and Budget, Government Accounting Office, and Inspector General offices. President Obasanjo has established a code of conduct for his new Cabinet and has made clear that he expects his ministers to meet very high ethical standards. These measures are essential to ensure that widespread corruption does not rob Nigerians of the significant benefits of a future ? healthy economy and free body politic.

Professionalization of the Military

After decades of military leadership, returning the military to their barracks and establishing a professional, nonpolitical army is one of Nigeria's highest priorities, and one that will take significant time and energy, as well as strong assistance and support from the international community. Significant reform, training, discipline, and active and constructive dialogue between civil societies and the military establishment are needed in both the short and long term. We applaud President Obasanjo's bold steps to take control of the military establishment so early in his Administration, by retiring 143 senior military officers, including 93 officers who had held political positions in previous military governments. Senior military officers were routinely appointed to governorships and other important positions normally held by civilians during Nigeria's last 16 years of military rule. This move indicates that Obasanjo, himself a former general, will not be intimidated and bodes well for the turnover of leadership to a civilian, democratic government.

National Reconciliation: Establishing Viable Democratic Institutions and Respect for Human Rights

In this regard, Nigerian leaders must also continue their efforts to establish functioning democratic institutions and to respect human rights. Over the past year, Nigeria has established an independent electoral commission, permitted the formation of political parties, halted government interference with labor unions, and bolstered the judiciary by appointing new judges to the Supreme Court. Today, Nigeria has an elected civilian government at all levels: local, state and national, and many of its institutions are modeled after those of the United States, including its National Assembly's Senate and House of Representatives. These civilian administrations are just beginning to function and to gain experience and confidence. Members already exhibit a serious commitment to establishing their constitutional roles. The House of Representatives, for example, successfully addressed its first serious crisis last month when the Speaker resigned because of allegations that he had falsified his credentials while running for office. The House quickly

followed constitutional procedures and elected a successor. President Obasanjo, for his part, is respecting the independence of the legislative, judicial and executive branches.

Nigeria also has made real progress in improving its human rights record by releasing political prisoners last year, including those accused of plotting against the Abacha regime. Although problems remain ? including the continued existence of Decree Two which permits indefinite detention without trial? Nigeria's new leaders have vastly improved citizens' treatment, a far cry from the past dictatorship days of vile and often violent oppression. In a very positive step, President Obasanjo has named a committee headed by a former Supreme Court judge to examine the human rights violations that took place during successive regimes since 1983. We hope Nigeria's leaders will continue this vital dialogue, including with elements of civil society and the opposition, in their efforts to reconcile the nation and establish the mechanisms essential for democratic consolidation.

National Reconciliation: Ethnic Conflict

Nowhere is dialogue more critical than in the Niger Delta region where continued ethnic unrest could threaten Nigeria's political transition and economic stability. Discontent caused by living in an economically depressed, ecologically ravaged environment while great oil wealth is pumped from the same area has exacerbated ethnic strife in this region.

Some ethnic groups, specifically the Ijaw and Itsekiri people, have been at virtual war for the past 2 years. Actions by Delta youth activists against oil production and transport facilities, many owned by American companies, disrupted as much as one-third of Nigeria's oil production last year. The government imposed a state of emergency last December following demands by local youth groups that all foreign-oil companies leave the Delta by the end of the year. Employees of oil companies have been held hostage and inter-ethnic group violence has continued. On May 30, militant Ijaw youths in the Delta attacked Itsekiri villages just across the river from a large Chevron plant. The ensuing violence left 200 dead.

Economic Reform

Problems in the Delta are symptomatic of prolonged government neglect and corruption that have devastated Nigeria's economy and led to massive poverty and gross inequalities in all corners of this huge country. Despite its rich resource endowment, Nigeria remains one of the poorest countries in the world. Nigerians now earn an average of only \$300 per year, compared to \$1,200 per year 20 years ago. A sharp drop in oil prices last year, proceeds from which constitute 95% of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings and 80% of government revenue, has depressed the economy even further.

Nigeria has had an unfunded International Monetary Fund Staff Monitoring Program (SMP) since February. If the country can remain sufficiently "on-track" with its SMP, the IMF could recommend that its Board approve an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility. This could pave the way for balance-of-payments support and possible debt restructuring. To reach this goal, Nigeria needs to continue to pursue a realistic budget, and institute tax reform and an effective program of privatization. These reforms are also necessary to build business confidence and attract domestic and foreign investment. Without these measures, broad-based growth and development could stall with negative implications for political stability and democracy.

United States Policy

The road ahead for Nigeria is a steep climb; nevertheless, the United States stands ready to be an active and supportive partner. Since the Abubakar transition, we have steadily increased lines of communication with our Nigerian counterparts and rewarded progress with serious attention,

hands-on counsel and, when appropriate, bilateral assistance. The US lifted visa sanctions on October 26, 1998; the sanctions were imposed during the Abacha regime. We provided electoral assistance for local elections in December, state elections in January, and legislative and presidential elections in February.

US assistance to Nigeria for the period of October 1998 to September 1999 will be approximately \$27.5 million, targeted toward democratic institution-building, health care and the strengthening of civil society. To assist with the professionalization of the military, we are lifting restrictions on military sales, beginning a robust civil-military relations training program, and proposing to provide IMET funding for a very few select Nigerian military officials to begin training. We also have been working to help Nigerians meet the increasing challenge of promoting reconciliation and preventing ethnic conflict. In the last 6 months, our Special Envoy for the Promotion of Democracy in Africa, Reverend Jesse Jackson, has met twice with Delta leaders. Former President Carter also went to the Delta to meet with its leaders and in February, the United States helped sponsor a local conference on conflict resolution and sustainable development. We plan to target some remaining FY 1999 funding toward additional reconciliation and resolution programs in the region and other conflict areas in Nigeria.

Last month, an Interagency Assessment Team comprised of representatives from eight US Government agencies discussed possible programs to assist Nigeria in establishing mechanisms to stem corruption, consolidate its institutions and promote economic reform with President Obasanjo, Vice President Atiku, and others. With the coordination of the Inter-agency Working Group on Nigeria, a subsequent USAID and Department of Defense civil-military team (which just returned last week) discussed Nigeria's peacekeeping efforts and plans for right-sizing and re-professionalizing the military. To support critical economic reform measures, the Interagency Assessment Team also outlined our vision for a Joint Economic Partnership Committee (JEPC), proposed when then-Under Secretary Eizenstat was in the region. Following the team's visit, a specialized technical team from Transportation traveled to Nigeria to review infrastructure rehabilitation and airport security issues. We want to work closely with members of Congress, including this Committee, toward a significant increase in assistance to Nigeria in FY 2000 and beyond. Such cooperation is in both countries' interest.

One of the major barriers to increased US assistance to Nigeria, as members know, has been the lack of cooperation in countering narcotics. We cannot provide direct assistance to any government not meeting the standards for either certification or a waiver. In March, President Clinton —acknowledging our vital interests in supporting the transition to democratic government that was underway in the country— provided a Vital National Interests Certification to Nigeria. We want to work with Nigeria this year to increase bilateral cooperation in both counter-narcotics and law enforcement to ensure the country can meet the requirements for certification. Indeed, it is in our own national interests to do so. Approximately 30% of heroin intercepted at US ports of entry in recent years was seized from Nigerian-controlled couriers, and already Americans lose \$2 billion annually to white collar crime syndicates based in Nigeria.

The Nigerian Government also would like to see a resumption of direct flights between the United States and Nigeria, dependent upon sufficient improvements in technical aspects of airport security and regulations. We have made plain to the government that we are committed to working with them to remove the flight ban on Lagos Airport. We have already noted significant progress in meeting the International Civil Aviation Organization's minimum security standards.

Conclusion

The Clinton Administration is committed to working with the Subcommittee on Africa, and indeed with the entire Congress as we seek to forge a new US-Nigeria relationship in the context of a successful transition to civilian democratic rule. We stand at an important crossroads throughout Africa. We have what President Clinton recently described as "an historic opportunity to work with Africans to build a more peaceful and prosperous future for the continent." Nowhere is the window of opportunity wider than in Nigeria. As post-apartheid South Africa did at the end of this century, a democratically stable, economically strong Nigeria has the chance to do at the beginning of the next ? better the lives of hundreds of millions of Africans at home and abroad. We look forward to working with you to make clear to the new leadership that we support them as they consider the vast implications of a triumphant Nigeria to West Africa and beyond ? and choose the right path toward democracy and economic reform. I would be pleased to take your questions.